Duncan Green used a great metaphor in his recent blog when he called the recent mega-cuts in global aid budgets a tsunami. We are witnessing the sudden transformation of the aid sector that is losing life and diversity at a dizzying rate, like a coral reef weakened by rising sea temperatures and then battered by a mighty wave. And the good is being swept away with the bad.
Over the past year I’ve been giving methodological backup to a local partner on the Somali-Kenya border to work in a new way with ten rural communities. We’ve been supporting all kinds of different people there to reflect on their reality through storytelling and action. It has brought us into contact not only with remarkable people in the borderland, but also with people working in the humanitarian sector in the two countries, from local NGOs, to contractors, to donors, to UN. Everyone I’ve spoken to in the last few weeks has been in some kind of shock about the changing system. Some still don’t quite believe it’s happening, as programmes close, budgets evaporate, and collaborations dissolve.
For many it’s a question of how to save core operations. But for some of us, especially those of my peers working in insecure and damaged places, it’s a question of how to get back to the basics of who humanitarianism is for and what it’s for. It’s these actors that I’m most interested to watch and support as they pivot to make good out of the meltdown.
On the ground on the Somalia-Kenya border the effects of the tsunami are more muted. There never was much effective aid to these ten villages, even though they have been battered by 30 years of civil war and 15 years of efforts to counter the growing al-Shabaab insurgency. Local people work with each other to navigate indiscriminate violence, going about their lives as pastoralists, shop owners, mothers, traders, educators and the like. They rely on tradition for order, as elders and religious leaders solve disputes and pronounce on customary law, but importantly they are also innovating in fertile social networks that bring new ways of thinking and acting in society.
We heard examples of local people managing water systems, hiring their own teachers, and running generators to provide electricity to whole settlements. We heard how young people get businesses going, women negotiate better treatment by authorities, and how traders and pastoralists move where they need to, largely unmolested by the armed actors. They are paying taxes to both insurgents and at government checkpoints, negotiating the sums down as low as they can, and arguing for armed actors to leave their villages and livestock camps out of the firing line.
Summing it up, one of the community members explained that their way of life is a ‘middle way’ along which they navigate their survival, negotiate how they are treated and innovate in a changing society.
What can we learn from all of this? It’s not about what they need and don’t need in the way of material aid. It’s about how things bloom or how they get stuck in communities, wherever they are. Local experience of aid has been that its logo emblazoned staff come, when they do appear at all, with announcements and interventions, or with workshops and new languages of how community should comport itself. They don’t ask how the community already blooms and where it gets stuck.
What could the middle way mean for us as we navigate the new normal? I think that the way these ten communities are managing local governance (away from government and aid agencies) gives us pointers as to how to work better in their support. It’s not a new idea, rather it’s one that for me started with Robert Chambers’ question ‘whose reality counts?’ Community reality is changing rapidly, and if we want to align with it, we need to understand it and engage with it.
Participatory activists and innovative philanthropists all over the world already know this. They already have a myriad of wonderful ways of aligning. Last year Niranjan Nampoothiri and I did a small project for Citizen University in Seattle. We had the luxury of spending quality time with seven amazing participatory activists in seven countries around the world, learning who they are and how they do things, and sharing that with participatory activists in the US. They showed us an elegant, simple and determined set of ways of working well for the common good.
Duncan Green suggests that people coming afresh to the aid sector in this tumultuous time should consider avoiding the most stressed agencies. He suggested that instead of approaching those who depend on massive funding and high overheads, they should offer their services to those resilient organisations that emphasise social enterprise, solidarity and innovation at low cost and to big effect.
If rather than using a deficit model based on filling southern needs with generous northern largesse, we rebuilt after the great aid tsunami using a surplus model by which groups, communities, and municipalities strengthen themselves (with a little help from their friends), I think the people of our ten small places on the Somalia-Kenya border might congratulate us for finally getting it right.
Since the ouster of the Assad regime in December 2024, the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria as a key smuggling corridor. For over a decade, it is reported that the group has freely moved drugs, money, and weapons through Syrian territory to finance and arm itself. In an effort to translate promises into action, the new authorities have ramped up security along the border with Lebanon, dismantled drug trafficking infrastructure, and intercepted arms shipments destined for Hezbollah.
While these measures have likely disrupted Hezbollah’s operations completely, eradicating smuggling remains an immense challenge. Hezbollah’s entrenched networks, the economic drivers of illicit trade, the transitional authorities’ limited security capacity, and the sheer scale of the porous border all make total elimination unlikely. Without a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy, cross-border smuggling will persist in post-Assad Syria.
Disrupting Hezbollah networks
Given its longstanding alliance with the Assad regime and direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah has become a prime target for the country’s new leadership. Despite the group’s withdrawal following Assad’s fall, the transitional authorities have taken a firm stance against Hezbollah-linked smuggling. Since Assad’s defeat, they have reportedly intercepted 13 weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah and arrested individuals involved in arms smuggling. They have also seized large quantities of narcotics and shut down drug production facilities across central and southern Syria.
On 6 February 2025, the crackdown escalated with the launch of a large-scale security operation in Qusayr, a strategic Hezbollah stronghold near the porous Syrian–Lebanese border. The operation targeted over a dozen villages that had remained under Hezbollah’s control and are home to Lebanese Shia families with longstanding ties to the group.
Syria’s Ministry of Defence stated that the campaign aimed to sever key smuggling routes in this critical region, which, according to the Homs border security chief Major Nadim Madkhana, had served as ‘an economic lifeline for Hezbollah and traffickers of drugs and arms.’ In fierce battles lasting several days, security forces uncovered more than 15 drug production facilities, stockpiles of illicit materials, and a counterfeit currency printing press producing fake $100 bills.
Interwoven challenges
Despite the recent successes of the transitional authorities, Hezbollah-linked smuggling operations are unlikely to end soon. Several key factors ensure their persistence. The 330-kilometre Syrian–Lebanese border remains inherently difficult to monitor. Much of it is unmarked and winds through valleys and mountains – terrain long exploited by drug smugglers and arms traffickers.
Compounding this challenge, Hezbollah has spent over a decade entrenching its presence along the border, building an extensive network of covert paths and tunnels to facilitate illicit activities. This deeply rooted infrastructure makes it nearly impossible to eliminate smuggling routes through security operations alone. The group also maintains a firm grip on the Syrian side of the border, particularly in the Beqaa Valley.
Additionally, Hezbollah’s long-standing ties to local smuggling networks bolster its ability to sustain cross-border operations. These networks reportedly include whose members operate on both sides of the border and have deep affiliations with Hezbollah. Heavily armed and well-resourced, these families have been engaged in smuggling for generations and possess intimate knowledge of the terrain. By leveraging their expertise, resources, and adaptability, these local networks can quickly respond to security crackdowns, including by relocating to areas inside Lebanon when targeted by Syrian authorities and vice versa. In addition to identifying alternative routes when necessary, smugglers are strengthening their operations by employing more sophisticated evasion tactics, such as concealing illicit substances within legitimate goods.
Furthermore, Syria’s deepening economic crisis, widespread unemployment, skyrocketing living costs, and high demand for both legal and illicit smuggled goods make smuggling an increasingly essential lifeline for border communities.
The capacity problem
Syria’s fragile security situation and the limited capacity of its new authorities present significant challenges to achieving their stated objectives. Despite toppling the Assad regime in just 11 days, the new leadership – led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – lacks the military and security infrastructure needed to effectively govern and secure the vast territories left in the regime’s wake. While efforts are underway to strengthen their capabilities, this process will take time.
Militarily, the HTS-led coalition remains fragmented. Although HTS, as Syria’s de facto ruling force, has persuaded most armed factions to merge under the Ministry of Defence, this unity is largely superficial. Many factions continue to operate under their original command structures, limiting overall cohesion and effectiveness.
Security forces are even more constrained. The new authorities primarily rely on HTS-linked General Security, an understaffed and overstretched force that functions more like an armed crisis response unit than a fully operational security apparatus. As a result, it lacks the resources to effectively monitor the border with Lebanon or combat the operations run by various networks, including Hezbollah’s.
The situation is similarly dire in Lebanon, where security forces also struggle with capacity issues. Their presence in Hezbollah strongholds – especially in the Beqaa Valley – is minimal to non-existent.
A broader strategy is needed
Syria’s new authorities have shown clear determination to disrupt Hezbollah’s illicit smuggling networks, particularly those involving weapons and drugs. As the transitional government builds capacity, Hezbollah’s cross-border operations will face increasing risks. However, eliminating the group’s ability to use Syria as a smuggling corridor will remain a formidable challenge – at least through military means alone.
A lasting solution requires a comprehensive strategy rooted in strong coordination between Syrian, Lebanese, and international actors. Beyond bolstering border security, efforts must address the root causes of smuggling by curbing demand for both illicit and legal contraband while investing in economic development programmes that offer viable alternatives to those who rely on smuggling for survival. Without these measures, Hezbollah’s entrenched networks will continue to exploit Syria’s vulnerabilities, deepening instability within the country and threatening broader regional security.
This article originally appeared on Kalam, the website of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.
In January, the Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF), a Saudi-backed Salafi force under the command of the president of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, deployed several units to the eastern Yemeni governorate of Mahra. The deployment, and the opposition if provoked from the Peaceful Protest Committee in Mahra Governorate (PPCMG), a social movement opposed to growing roles in Mahra by countries other than Oman, reflected a revival of the Saudi-Omani rivalry there. This threatens to undermine the governorate’s stability and deepen political fragmentation among Mahris themselves.
Prior to the deployment, Sheikh Ahmad Belhaf, the former chief of external relations in the PPCMG, welcomed the NSF forces and announced his defection from the protest committee over the alleged “spread of a Houthi agenda.” He also established a splinter group known as the Corrective Path of the PPCMG. At the same time, Sheikh Ali Salem al-Huraizi, a prominent Omani-backed tribal figure who chairs the PPCMG and has good relations with Ansar Allah, called for public mobilization against the Salafi presence and Saudi influence.
As in neighboring Hadhramawt, the NSF in Mahra has sought to expand its presence through local recruitment—including among non-Salafis—to secure buy-in. It has also reportedly made a commitment to avoiding any acts that would be unwelcome to the local community. This recruitment will extend a source of livelihood to a few thousand Mahris, deepening their engagement in security provision in their governorate. However, it also serves the purpose of counterbalancing the influence of Huraizi’s tribal forces, who have received monthly salaries of up to 200 Omani riyals from Muscat (the equivalent of around $530), according to a local tribal figure. In late February, key tribal figures, security and military personnel, local officials, and civil society activists attended a public meeting in Mahra’s Qishn district with the head of the NSF, demonstrating a degree of local acceptance.
By expanding the NSF’s operational control into Mahra, Saudi Arabia endeavors to increase its influence near the governorate’s eastern border. Its objective is to strengthen border security and prevent the transfer of weapons through Oman to Ansar Allah, particularly equipment for the assembly of drones and missiles. Last December, the security authorities in Mahra announced the interception of fiber optic cables at the Sarfayt crossing between Yemen and Oman bound for Ansar Allah. Such cables are often used to enhance the stealth, range, and anti-jamming capabilities of drones.
To this end, Saudi Arabia and the local authorities in Mahra look to improve stabilization efforts in the governorate, while countering the influence of Ansar Allah and the PPCMG. For instance, the Saudi Program for the Development and Reconstruction of Yemen has established the King Salman Medical and Educational City, as well as a dialysis center, in Mahra to enhance health services. Additionally, the Saudis aim to curtail the expansion into Mahra of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks secession from Yemen. The STC has already expanded its presence in the neighboring governorate of Hadhramawt. An additional Saudi objective is to limit the influence in Mahra of the STC’s regional backer, the United Arab Emirates, which has gained influence along the Hadhramawt coast.
The deployment of the NSF in Mahra has intensified threat perceptions in Oman, which views the governorate from the national security and domestic stability angles. The sultanate fears the expansion of Salafi ideology into Oman’s western regions, given their predominantly Sunni makeup and the implications for civil peace in Dhofar. Additionally, Oman does not want to see the Saudi sphere of influence expand to its borders. Between 2015 and 2021, Muscat opposed the growing military presence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Mahra, and it used the PPCMG and the tribal networks it supports to do so, given the historical ties that Oman enjoys with the governorate. Indeed, Oman has sought to counterbalance rising external interference in Mahra, fearing that this could lead to the greater sway of other Gulf states in an area the Omanis have long regarded as being part of their sphere of influence.
Since December 2024, the PPCMG had rallied the public against the NSF presence and growing Saudi influence in Mahra. In early January, Huraizi announced a new phase of peaceful resistance to “interference and a sectarian agenda,” and accused Saudi Arabia of “destabilizing” the governorate. He staged protests against the NSF, including in Ghaidha, Mahra’s capital. In mid-February, there were reports of skirmishes between anti-NSF tribal militias and forces that appeared to have been mistaken for the NSF. Despite the apparent error in identification, the incident demonstrated the potential for armed confrontation. Signs of discontent are unlikely to fade, as there have been similar actions for over a decade in the governorate.
Nevertheless, full confrontation between the Saudi-backed NSF and the Omani-backed PPCMG remains unlikely for several reasons. First, the muhafiz, or governor, of Mahra, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Yasser, has focused on the containment of potential escalation by adhering to the Mahri tribal code of conduct and reactivating dialogue channels, while boosting the vigilance of local security forces. Second, Riyadh has adopted a long-game approach in Mahra by improving bilateral cooperation with Oman, including through economic support, in a way that also reduces tension.
Manifestations of such tension will likely continue to be expressed by local proxies, probably through sporadic protests, limited attacks, and antagonistic political rhetoric. However, Saudi Arabia and Oman should participate in talks to preserve stability and prevent a deterioration of the situation. Mahra’s muhafiz will also have to pursue more proactive engagement and initiate a dialogue with Huraizi to reduce political polarization and contain any further acts of instability.
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The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) plays a significant role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance, with its links to Iraq’s state security forces raising concerns about its influence and access to power. However, the IRI is not a unified organization; it consists of multiple armed factions, each with its own agendas and domestic interests, not all of which align with Iran’s objectives.
In this episode of the War Studies podcast, Dr. Craig Larkin speaks to Dr. Inna Rudolf and Dr. Renad Mansour, King’s College London XCEPT scholars, about their research into the IRI. They examine the domestic and transnational interests of IRI factions and discuss the extent to which the IRI can truly be considered an Iranian ‘proxy’.
Mohanad Hage Ali is the deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the shifting geopolitics and Islamist groups after the Arab uprisings. He has just published a paper at Carnegie, titled “Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking,” and Diwan interviewed him in late March to discuss the topic of his paper and the nature of drug production in Lebanon, notably of Captagon, a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline.
Michael Young: You have just published a paper on Lebanon and the risks of Captagon trafficking. What is the main argument you make, and what are the consequences of such trafficking?
Mohanad Hage Ali: My central argument is that Captagon trafficking poses a threat that extends beyond drugs and law enforcement, presenting deeper challenges to Lebanon’s political system and its ability to recover during this transitional phase. This is due to two key factors. First, the structure of the Captagon network has concentrated wealth in the hands of a select group of drug barons, strengthening their influence. Second, Lebanon’s ongoing financial and economic crises have severely weakened state institutions. With the Lebanese currency, the pound, having lost over 98 percent of its value in the past four years, Lebanon’s security forces and state capacity to combat the drug threat have been significantly eroded. The prevailing assumption today is that in Lebanon and Syria new political orders are emerging on the ruins of the old, given the changes in both countries in the past year. However, the illicit networks may not only survive this transition, they may come to play a central role in shaping the new reality.
MY: In your paper, you highlight the difference between a new breed of Captagon traffickers and more traditional tribal clan-based traffickers, who mainly produce hashish, or cannabis, as well as opium. What are the major differences between the two?
MHA: Clan-based hashish networks operate in a more decentralized manner, with a structure that includes working with peasant cultivators, traders, and independent transnational smuggling networks. This disperses profits among different actors, limiting the concentration of financial power and, consequently, the ability to secure political influence. While some clan-based traffickers may have been elected to Lebanon’s parliament, or can be in the future, their focus tends to be on personal prestige and community representation rather than advancing their illicit trade.
In contrast, Captagon traffickers are deeply embedded in every stage of their business—production, smuggling, and international distribution—allowing them to accumulate significant capital. This financial power translates into direct political leverage, enabling them to influence state institutions primarily to serve their business interests. Unlike clan-based traffickers, whose tribal affiliations and local obligations often restrict their capacity for broader political control, Captagon networks strategically infiltrate political and security structures to facilitate and protect their operations.
Captagon traffickers have a far more expansive international footprint. Many of the key figures hail from the Lebanese-Syrian border region, maintaining strong cross-border connections and, in some cases, holding dual nationality. Their direct ties to the demand markets grant them a global reach that clan-based hashish networks lack. While hashish trafficking in Lebanon has traditionally been a localized challenge for authorities, the Captagon trade operates on a scale that poses a systemic threat to state institutions, security agencies, and the country’s political center itself.
MY: How extensive has been the involvement of Lebanon’s political parties, or specific politicians, in drug trafficking? How about state institutions?
MHA: The first level of involvement is through local networks, which often receive protection in exchange for loyalty and support from politicians or parties. Such dynamics have historically been a cross-sectarian phenomenon in the Beqaa Valley. Unlike traditional trafficking groups tied to specific factions, Captagon barons have not been affiliated with a single political party. Instead, they have cultivated a broad spectrum of connections across the political system, granting them greater flexibility and freedom of movement.
The second level of involvement is direct facilitation, as seen in the case of Hezbollah in Syria. As an ally of the former Syrian regime, Hezbollah maintained a military presence throughout the country, and its name has surfaced in multiple investigations as a facilitator of the Captagon trade. Given the industrial-scale involvement in Captagon trafficking of the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armored Division, which was controlled by Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar al-Assad, and given that the unit was a key Hezbollah ally, it is hard to believe that the party remained detached from Syria’s booming drug trade. The same logic applies on the Lebanese side of the border with respect to Hezbollah, where individual links and territorial control would have made the party’s complete disengagement from trafficking nearly impossible.
MY: With Lebanon facing a new political reality since the war with Israel—by which I mean Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—how has this affected Captagon trafficking?
MHA: With the Syrian regime at the center of Captagon production, its downfall in December dealt a significant blow to the drug trade. Whether it will recover, even partially, depends on two key factors. The first is production capacity, as demand for Captagon remains strong in the Gulf states and beyond. Despite the setback, production continues in opposition-held areas of Syria, including northern parts of the country controlled by the so-called Syrian National Army, as well as in southern Syria, making it possible to satisfy this demand, at least partly. A similar situation applies to Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, though current production levels remain relatively low.
The second factor is whether the new leaderships in Lebanon and Syria can provide viable economic alternatives to drug production. However, given ongoing sanctions on Syria and security challenges in both countries, achieving this in the short term is unlikely. International and regional actors seeking to curb drug trafficking must take this into account and act swiftly, whether by reconsidering sanctions or supporting economic recovery efforts. The collapse of state institutions remains a central driver of the Captagon trade, making sustainable economic solutions all the more urgent.
MY: What do you propose is the best way to wean clan-based Lebanese traffickers away from growing and selling hashish? Do you think this is realistic?
MHA: The state should take steps to legalize hashish for certain medical purposes, thereby separating the farming of hashish from trafficking. This would reduce drug-related crimes, weaken smuggling networks, and ensure that farmers benefit directly from the industry. It is also the core principle behind a 2020 law passed in Lebanon, which was not implemented due to the country’s governance crisis at the time. The government must follow through with its implementation, drawing lessons from Morocco, which has made significant progress in this area, generating substantial state revenues. So far, planting alternative crops to replace hashish and other narcotics has failed, which makes the legalization of hashish a critical opportunity to regulate the sector effectively.
This publication was produced with support from the X-Border Local Research Network, a program funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
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I became involved in the Cross-border Conflict Evidence, Policy, and Trends (XCEPT) programme’s Local Research Network (LRN) at its inception in 2018. During the following years, the network introduced me to a wider community of researchers who share a similar interest in cross-border issues. This has led to extensive knowledge sharing and fruitful collaborations, particularly in terms of my personal focus on how agricultural transitions impact the experiences of women.
As well as helping me cultivate my networks within South Sudan, being part of the LRN has given me the opportunity to expand my horizons internationally. For example, I attended workshops in Bangkok, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, which opened my eyes to different research methodologies and provided me with guidance on writing policy papers. These skills have been further reinforced by online peer exchange events with the XCEPT programme’s international partners. I have also been able to establish lasting connections with employees of various UN agencies, NGOs, embassies and research institutions within and beyond South Sudan.
More generally, by fostering collaborative research projects with researchers from neighbouring countries, XCEPT enables comparative analysis and a more holistic understanding of cross-border dynamics. Just as importantly, the LRN facilitates direct access to local communities and their perspectives on cross-border issues, something I have found invaluable when it comes to unpacking the functioning of conflict and cooperation in borderlands. This approach has informed the various papers, blog posts and articles I have written or contributed to over recent years.
From a personal perspective, I can testify that my involvement in the project has vastly improved my data analysis and writing skills, bolstering my capacity to conduct impactful cross-borders research. In addition, I have put to practical use XCEPT capacity-building sessions on—among other subjects—conducting sensitive research in conflict zones.
Conducting fieldwork under XCEPT
I have had many extraordinary experiences during the fieldwork I conducted for XCEPT in South Sudan. In particular, I cherish my memories of women from different communities sharing their stories and experiences with me. As a South Sudanese woman who grew up in a cattle camp, I felt able to engage with my interviewees on an equal footing, providing me with insights an outsider may have struggled to glean.
Overall, my fieldwork has yielded a treasure trove of fascinating life stories. The passion for writing I have developed is in part driven by a desire to share these unique experiences with audiences around the world—something I consider to be a meaningful act of advocacy. In this respect, I am particularly proud of a briefing paper I wrote for XCEPT as part of the ‘Displaced Tastes’ research project, entitled ‘Migrating with Seeds: Women, agricultural knowledge and displacement in South Sudan’. Given the personal importance of this work, I go into further detail below, pulling out some key quotes.
Migrating with seeds
XCEPT’s focus on policy solutions means that the programme’s publications—from blog pieces to briefings to full-length reports—are tailored towards offering practical solutions to everyday challenges in conflict-affected border regions. The utility of this is demonstrated by the fact that South Sudan’s Ministry of Agriculture has acknowledged a number of important policy recommendations highlighted by the Displaced Tastes project. Moreover, ‘Migrating with Seeds’ was read by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and its partners, playing a role in the Rift Valley Institute (the managing organization for XCEPT) being given responsibility for the Participatory Impact Assessment of its seed provision interventions in South Sudan.
The basis for ‘Migrating with Seeds’ was the life story of my aunt, Mary Ajok Wetkwuot, born in 1961 in Rumbek East County, Lakes State. As I describe in my briefing, ‘I came to know her as a loving and kind-hearted person born into a family dominated by women’. Her story is a fascinating one:
Mary left Rumbek in the early 1980s because of aerial bombardments during the Second Sudanese Civil War and, after settling in Wau for two years, she crossed into northern Sudan. … When she first was displaced from Rumbek, she travelled with a small black bag containing her favourite sorghum and millet seeds, which she planted in every location she was displaced to.
Over time, my aunt experienced a shift from ‘a communal to a commercial system of agriculture’. Responding to this, she ‘tried hard to preserve the tastes and networks of the old system in the new one’, and ‘By travelling with seeds, often across borders, Mary allowed people living in displacement in Kassala to keep their grain traditions alive’. In doing so, she made a name for herself as a farmer of kech (a type of sorghum):
Over the past decades, Mary has continued to transmit this farming and cooking knowledge to her daughters, cousins and grandchildren, and with the harvest of the kech seeds with which she first departed from Rumbek in the 1980s, she has built a reputation that spans the Sudans.
When I came to interview her for the briefing:
She had claimed a small corner of the barracks where she was growing indigenous varieties of sorghum and millet. Although she had carved out a space for her agricultural activities, she expressed a longing to return to her vast ancestral land in Rumbek, to farm in the soil that she grew up in.
Not only is my aunt’s story deeply meaningful to me, I felt it could cast light on ‘the changing tastes for food in South Sudan in the context of the country’s economic transition and place in the regional, cross-border economy of grain’, as well as how local women deployed the ‘social and material capital of seeds … to manage the wider transitions experienced during South Sudan’s decades of war’. The positive reception the briefing received hopefully proves I succeeded in putting across these wider concerns, and is testament to XCEPT’s willingness to give priority to the knowledge produced by locally-based researchers.
The Author
Elizabeth Nyibol Malou is a researcher with the Rift Valley Institute in South Sudan, and is the author most recently of The Triple Burden: Women selling their labour in South Sudan. She was previously a lecturer at the Catholic University of South Sudan, in Juba.
I was first invited to join the Cross-border Conflict Evidence, Policy, and Trends (XCEPT) programme in 2019, having previously worked with the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) on research in South Sudan. This innovative project brought together international experts and early career researchers from across Africa and Asia under the umbrella of the Local Research Network (LRN). I was thrilled to be a part of it. The blog piece below offers my reflections on my time with the XCEPT programme, including what I personally gained from it and, conversely, what I was able to contribute towards it.
One of the LRN’s many strengths is that it enables early career researchers to work directly with more experienced experts when performing fieldwork. While some studies involve collaborative work between experts and locals, others are independently led by local researchers backed up by mentorship support from experts.
Not only has this approach enhanced the capacity and skills of many early career researchers—myself included—it has produced a wealth of locally grounded insights into the causes and impacts of borderland conflicts. These in turn have fed into a series of in-depth research reports aimed at national, regional and international policymakers.
The three phases of my involvement in XCEPT
My involvement in the XCEPT programme spanned six years (2019–2024) and can be broken down into three interconnected phases. During the first phase, I was invited to participate in several training workshops om methodologies and writing skills organized by XCEPT partners. More specifically, I attended a 2019 policy brief writing skill workshop in Beirut organized by Carnegie Middle East Centre (CMEC); a gender and generation workshop in Nairobi the same year; and ethics training at the Catholic University campus in Juba in early 2020—the latter two both organized by the RVI.
I had completed my undergraduate studies in South Sudan just a year before joining XCEPT, and at that point I could not paraphrase, cite or reference the work of others properly, let alone write a coherent full-length essay that put forward my own views. South Sudan’s education system is based on teaching students to read and memorize texts, with little emphasis placed on research and critical writing skills. This is compounded by poor educational facilities, such as a lack of modern libraries or access to digital resources.
By contrast, both the workshops themselves and the connections I forged with other research experts while attending them taught me a great deal about how research should be conducted. Looking back, my time spent at the workshops was fundamental in establishing my research career and an essential step in honing my writing skills.
The second phase—which to a degree overlapped with the first—revolved around collaborative research and mentorship support. Assuming the role of junior co-researcher, I collaborated with a more seasoned research expert on two major studies on the South Sudan–Sudan borderlands. Conducted over the course of 2019 and 2020, the research delved into centre–periphery relations, focusing on militarization, labour and migration.
As co-researcher, I participated in the entire research process, from design to publication and dissemination. This hands-on experience was invaluable, as was the mentorship and support provided by the senior researcher. In particular, their guidance was crucial when it came to putting the knowledge and skills I had gained from the training workshops into practice. During our two years of collaboration, I wrote a number of blog pieces on borderland dynamics, enhancing my writing skills and giving me the confidence to take the next step of conducting research independently.
So began the third phase of my involvement in XCEPT, made possible in part by the project’s underling principle of democratizing theory and practice. Not having to spend years familiarizing myself with complex, established theories gave me the opportunity to pursue independent research work at a much earlier stage than might otherwise have been the case.
The research I conducted during this time built on the previous collaborative work, exploring cross-border labour migration and conflicts on the South Sudan–Sudan border through a livelihood transition and conflict lens. The tangible outcome was two long reports (alongside numerous briefings) examining the impacts of war, migration and work on, firstly, South Sudan’s changing social relations, and, secondly, agricultural labour and cross-border migration.
How I benefited from XCEPT
My years spent at XCEPT have sparked a profound interest in cross-border migration, conflict and livelihood transitions, motivating me to continue exploring these themes in my future research. My ongoing PhD thesis, for instance, focuses on the bidirectional relationships between war economies and agrarian transitions in the South Sudan borderlands. Here, my aim is to build on the existing XCEPT research (as well as other sources) in order to better understand how such transitions reshape gendered patterns of accumulation, class structures and people’s economic livelihoods.
I have also benefited from further XCEPT workshops while transitioning into academia. For instance, two particularly useful workshops were held in 2014: one in Bangkok organized by the Asia Foundation and the other in Addis Ababa by RVI. While the former covered essential gender concepts, the latter elucidated key borderland theories. Not only did the workshops help inform my PhD research, they provided a pathway for the early career researchers in attendance to convert their XCEPT policy reports into peer-reviewed articles.
My involvement in XCEPT also allowed me to network with experts from across the globe, both early career researchers and long-serving professionals and academics. This threw up countless opportunities to learn from the work and experiences of others. Similarly, I met diplomats and officials from various international governments and NGOs at XCEPT engagements, expanding my sphere of acquaintances beyond the research community.
Finally, I learned many new things about places and people in the borderlands I had previously thought I knew everything about. Not only have the friendships I made and maintained with borderland residents enriched my life, they will be an essential element in my future research endeavours, providing easier access and useful contacts across the region.
What I contributed to XCEPT
Reflecting on my time with XCEPT, I like to think I not only benefited from the project, but was able to make a significant personal contribution to its work. I, along with my fellow early career researchers, produced numerous reports applying locally grounded knowledge and perspectives to relevant policy discussions. In addition, as part of the LRN, I disseminated research findings and recommendations to numerous international and national-level policymakers. Among the key events I participated in were gatherings at Chatham House and SOAS in London in 2019, and meetings at the UK embassy in Nairobi and the EU compound in Juba in 2021, not to mention several online events via digital platforms.
At the local level, I actively distributed copies of my reports, engaging local officials, traditional leaders, youth and women in informal discussions to ensure they had access to my findings. When doing so, I made sure to garner feedback on my work. At the other end of the scale, I attended engagements with officials and experts from international governments and agencies seeking to learn more about the South Sudan–Sudan borderlands.
As a member of the LRN, I also sought to build the capacity of others, participating in numerous XCEPT-organized courses and seminars held in Juba aimed at training new research assistants. Alongside these, RVI organized reflection workshops—led mostly by early career researchers, with support from experienced experts—in which we discussed challenges faced in the field and how we might mitigate them. The workshops provided an important peer exchange, learning and improvement platform for both the early career researchers and the newly trained research assistants.
In addition to leading the reflection and peer exchange workshops, I provided secondary mentorship support to the research assistants. In combination, these efforts provided many fresh undergraduates with the skills they needed to conduct qualitative research, enhancing RVI’s ability to cost-effectively reach hard-to-access areas in South Sudan.
Concluding thoughts
The impact of XCEPT on my research career extends far beyond capacity and skills development. Crucial as these elements are, their importance is matched and even exceed by the enduring connections I established with researchers and officials at LRN networking events.
Overall, my personal experience is testament to the critical role played by the LRN in the research journey of early career researchers. With many of these researchers now seeking to convert their XCEPT reports into peer-reviewed papers, ongoing support from experienced experts is a must. To ensure this happens, continued Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office funding for the LRN and its networking events is needed.
The Author
Joseph Majok is a PhD student in African Studies and a long-time national research consultant with the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) in South Sudan. He holds an MSc in Africa and International Development from the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Majok has been with the RVI since 2017 as a research assistant and later as part of the RVI national researchers’ team. He was involved in numerous projects and extensively in the FCDO’s XCEPT consortium project as a member of the Local Research Network. Through XCEPT, Majok has co-authored and independently written several reports, policy briefs and blogs on cross-border migrations and livelihood transitions.
In 2019, I became a local researcher with the Cross-border Conflict Evidence, Policy, and Trends (XCEPT) programme, run by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI), an independent non-profit organization seeking to foster local knowledge on social, political and economic development in Eastern and Central Africa. Though this was not my first research experience, it was my introduction to being part of a global team of researchers—something that greatly broadened my horizons. With this in mind, the following blogpost details my varied experiences in Somalia as part of the XCEPT team.
A personal journey of growth
Enthused and curious, I joined the XCEPT team in the hope of amplifying voices too often sidelined in mainstream research. At that point, I had little idea of the extent to which the coming years would not only nurture my professional growth, but grant me unique insights into the centring of local perspectives.
In short, participating in the XCEPT project has been an enriching experience. Hands-on research in a variety of remote, conflict-affected borderlands has opened my eyes to the possibilities of research methodologies, data analysis and collaborative research design. More importantly, I have honed my ability to navigate complex social and cultural dynamics, giving me the confidence to work in environments where trust is a precious commodity.
A couple of moments in particular stand out. On one occasion I was leading a focus group discussion in the border district of Galkayo. At first, I was apprehensive about how the community members would perceive yet another data collector turning up. I needn’t have worried—my shared cultural background and understanding of local customs proved invaluable in giving the participants the assurances they needed to share their hopes and fears. For me, this experience reaffirmed the importance of using local researchers, particularly female ones, who are embedded in the communities they study.
Another experience that sticks in my mind took place when I was conducting interviews with women khat traders in Galkayo. One day, I had the rare opportunity to follow a woman named Shukri, experiencing firsthand the daily lives of those involved in the khat trade. It gave me a profound insight I might otherwise have overlooked into the struggles local women deal with as a matter of course.
Outputs from my XCEPT research
Seeking to make innovative use of my encounter with Shukri, I helped create an online visual timelinedepicting her life journey, experiences and networks. This took place during the Understanding and Visualising the ‘Transnational Everyday’ in the Horn of Africa sessions that were held in Addis Ababa in 2020, as part of the process of producing an interactive report on how individuals move and interact across borders.
I also drew on my interactions with the khat traders when writing a briefing for RVI called ‘Khat and COVID-19: Somalia’s cross-border economy in the time of coronavirus’ and a longer report titled ‘Galkayo’s Khat Trade: The role of women traders in Puntland, Somalia’. As this suggests, the research I conducted was used extensively in a variety of forms, underlining both its value and the willingness of XCEPT to seek new ways of disseminating information. Moreover, from a personal point of view, it gave me a deep insight into the complex socioeconomic landscape of Galkayo and the wider region.
The trade in khat—a mild stimulant, widely consumed by men in particular—is one of the most lucrative business sectors in the cross-border economy of the Somali regions. Additionally, the fact that khat leaves are grown in the highland areas of Kenya and Ethiopia before being exported to Somalia makes it a transnational sector. Overall, the khat trade is extremely profitable, providing numerous jobs and business opportunities for Somalis, while generating considerable revenue for various authorities. To quote my previously mentioned briefing:
According to the Somaliland Annual Statistical Report 2018, khat ordinarily accounts for 30 per cent of domestic revenues, or USD 36,449,435. Between USD 120,000 and USD 150,000 was collected daily from tax on khat imports in Kalabaydh customs station.
Nevertheless, statistical reports such as this often generalize data regarding the khat business in Somalia, thereby failing to include the voices of women. This is despite the fact, to quote my report:
For women in Puntland, many of whom live under challenging financial circumstances while fulfilling the role of breadwinner of their household, the khat trade provides opportunities to make money to support their families. Mostly this is through petty trade—selling khat in the market—which women are seen as being particularly effective at. … Having their own source of income can give women freedom and independence.
Some of the more successful women, known locally as ‘khat queens’, have even managed to gain a degree of commercial and political power through their business achievements in the sector. Amid this context, the closure of borders and subsequent governmental bans on khat that accompanied the Covid-19 pandemic had dire impacts for those engaged in khat trade, especially women. Nevertheless, even in the face of these draconian measures, khat continued to enter Somalia via unconventional routes.
Contributions to local knowledge systems
As all of the above implies, collecting gender-desegregated data is key to obtaining the information necessary to inform successful policymaking. In terms of the Galkayo study, examining how gender and other social inequalities shape access to power helped bring women’s perspectives to the fore. These views in turn contributed to local decision-making and policy development. For example, local businesswomen became important stakeholders in discussions around societal, peacebuilding and conflict-resolution issues, leading to improved service delivery for women and their families.
Following the pandemic lockdown, the municipality adjusted its strategies to make them more in line with women’s needs and local cultural norms. In particular, greater emphasis was put on fostering collaboration.Through their associations, the women khat traders were able to increase their standing within the community, allowing them to move their merchandise to safer places in Galkayo.
A phrase used by several respondents in both South and North Galkayo was ‘War la helaa Talo la helaa’, which broadly speaking means that when you have information, you can make better decisions. Or, put another way, greater understanding of specific challenges yields more effective solutions. In the case of the safety issues confronting Galkayo’s women, this translated into more street lightening for khat traders and bigger, cleaner market spaces for businesswomen. Alongside this, several cases concerning outstanding debts were resolved to the benefit of the women involved and their families.
Local Research Network (LRN)
Taking a step back from my own work, the XCEPT Local Research Network (LRN) connects researchers from across the world—South Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Ethiopia and Somalia—through face-to-face and online training workshops and study tours. This collaborative spirit exemplifies the project’s ethos of centring local voices, spotlighting the importance of such perspectives in unpacking complex but often taken-for-granted issues.
Collaborating with researchers from different regions and disciplines provided me with fresh perspectives and a deeper appreciation of the interconnectedness of cross-border issues. These relationships have led to ongoing collaborations that continue to enrich my work. Reflecting on my experiences, I am filled with gratitude that I have been able to contribute to a project that so explicitly prioritizes local expertise.
On top of this, the skills and connections I developed through the XCEPT project have opened the door to numerous opportunities that lie beyond the immediate scope of my research. These range from speaking at international conferences to contributing to policy discussions at the national, regional and global level.
All this has reinforced my belief in the transformative potential of locally led research when it comes to influencing broader narratives and policies. Also, from a personal standpoint, the project expanded my professional network in ways I couldn’t have anticipated.
Benefits of knowledge and evidence for local communities
Today, there is greater awareness in Somalia about the knowledge and evidence generated by XCEPT. In particular, by prioritizing the expertise of local researchers and centring local voices, the project has not only added depth to its findings, but ensured the narratives of those living in conflict-affected borderlands are represented authentically.
XCEPT’s emphasis on expanding research networks in remote regions has been transformative. In providing a platform for marginalized communities to share their experiences, stereotypes have been challenged and understandings broadened. Having ready access to credible information is also a boon for practitioners, researchers, governments and non-governmental organizations alike, potentially leading to more nuanced, effective interventions.
The links between the XCEPT project and my PhD research
There are several links and overlaps between the XCEPT project and my PhD research project. To begin with, there are thematic overlaps as both projects seek to better understand how individuals, goods and ideas interact across conflict borders and transnationally, taking Somali women as their starting point. The findings from both projects contribute to better understanding of the lived realities of Somali businesswomen in Somali and those in diaspora. My PhD research project can help inform policy actors on how diaspora women and female refugees particularly Somalis in Zambia, establish belonging and political agency necessary for mobilizing, channeling, and delivering humanitarian relief aid to families and communities in Somalia during disasters.
There are methodological overlaps as well as both projects use qualitative research methods, such as ethnography, Key Informant Interviews, and Focus Group Discussions to capture lived experiences and narratives as critical in telling complex stories for shaping policy and practice. Through a wide range of data visualization techniques and working on the visualizing the ‘transnational everyday’ project, I have learned how to use tools such as Flowmap.blue and the free online platform StorymapJS—where I was able to upload qualitative material and plot locations by place-name or coordinates. I have used the knowledge and skills gained to make sense of data from narrative and life-history interviews and recounted journeys within and across borders to simplify personal testimonies, explanations, audio/visual material data collected from Somali businesswomen in Galkayo and Lusaka into routes of movement.
Insights from the XCEPT project have enriched my PhD analysis by providing comparative perspectives between fragility and transnationalism – women in the khat trade in Galkayo vis a vis diaspora businesswomen and female refugees in Zambia. My dual role as a researcher and practitioner in Somalia allowed for a practice-informed academic perspective. The XCEPT project offered me a platform for engagement with other researchers, policymakers, development actors, and local communities. My PhD research complements XCEPT’s broader objectives by deepening understanding of transnational movements of individuals, goods and ideas across conflict borders, fragile contexts and diaspora.
Final thoughts
Being part of the XCEPT project has shown me just how important local collaborations and support networks are when conducting research in conflict-affected areas. Beyond this, through listening to the diverse experiences shared by my fellow LRN researchers, I have learned the value of building trust among communities, particularly when navigating sensitive social, political and economic issues.
In terms of the research I undertook om behalf of XCEPT, the Galkayo study on the role of women in the cross-border khat trade economy offers concrete proof of how a focus on local knowledge can help in understanding community needs and promoting effective strategies, especially in conflict-prone areas.
The Author
Sahra Ahmed Koshin is a PhD Candidate at the Universities of Copenhagen and Nairobi, specializing in the Horn of African Diaspora. She holds two MA degrees—an MA in Cultural Anthropology from the Leiden University and an MA in Development Studies from Radboud University Nijmegen both in the Netherlands. Her research focuses on Diaspora Humanitarianism in Complex Crises, particularly the role of Somali businesswomen and female refugees in Zambia. She is a Somali gender expert specializing in integrating gender and inclusion across international development programs and activities.
Yemen’s Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, has expanded cross-border collaboration with non-state actors in Somalia, namely the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), which is associated with the Islamic State group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2014. While these groups diverge in ideology, ambition, and regional focus, they are united in their hostility to the United States and Israel, their pursuit of asymmetrical warfare, and their reliance on illicit economies. Such collaboration aims to strengthen and diversify supply chains, securing access to more sophisticated weaponry, improve the groups’ domestic standing, and increase the latitude of Ansar Allah and its main regional backer, Iran, to affect maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab Strait to their advantage. This situation has heightened the sources of instability in the broader region.
Much of the African Horn, especially the Red Sea littoral states, is integral to Yemen’s strategic depth due to its geographical proximity and long coastline. These factors have shaped historical patterns of migration, trade exchanges, cultural influence, and religious and social interactions. Yemen’s establishment of the Sanaa Cooperation Forum in 2003, which among other things addressed peace in Somalia, its mediation in the Somali crisis of 2006–2007, and its hosting of large numbers of displaced Somalis have underscored Yemeni preoccupation with the African country. Yemen has also been the African Horn’s gateway to the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, including during periods of instability and conflict. The International Organization for Migration reported that 96,670 people crossed the Gulf of Aden into Yemen in 2023 thanks to human trafficking networks, especially from Somalia’s Bari and Woqooyi Galbeed regions.
The arms trade in the Red Sea has been a leading factor in Ansar Allah’s ties with Somalia. Despite a United Nations arms embargo on Yemen, Iran has supplied weapons surreptitiously to Ansar Allah. Between September 2015 and January 2023, warships from the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, and Australia intercepted sixteen vessels, carrying approximately 29,000 small arms and light weapons, 365 anti-tank guided missiles, and 2.38 million rounds of ammunition bound for Ansar Allah. Most of the consignments were transported on dhows used for coastal trade and fishing. In 2020, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime concluded that a portion of Iranian-supplied arms to Ansar Allah ended up in Somalia.
While Iran’s dealings with African Horn countries have been characterized by ups and downs, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) prioritized the region after 1989, later intensifying its efforts in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 1989, Iran backed Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir’s rise; in 2006, it transferred weapons to the Islamic Courts Union so it could fight Somalia’s government; and in 2008 it sought a military presence in Eritrea, allowing it to use the Dahlak islands to send arms to Ansar Allah. In this way Tehran tried to break its international isolation, expand regional partnerships, and introduce supply mechanisms for its proxies, expanding its strategic reach.
Ansar Allah’s relationship with Somali nonstate actors, all of them under arms embargo, has evolved over the past decade through arms traffickers or brokers. This became increasingly important starting in 2016, when Ansar Allah realized it could strengthen its position by having a capacity to act in Yemen’s maritime space, whether by attacking vessels or engaging in smuggling—a lesson it applied during the Red Sea crisis over Gaza that began in October 2023. Ansar Allah’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, again expressed this view in January 2025, when he cited the group’s maritime operations on Gaza’s behalf, while supporting developments in “several African countries … against American and European hegemony, and American imperialism and occupation [there].” This signaled his interest in broadening Ansar Allah’s activities into Africa.
In June 2024, the United States reported on collaboration between al-Shabab and Ansar Allah. A United Nations report from February 2025 revealed that representatives of the two groups had met at least twice in July and September 2024 in Somalia, underscoring Ansar Allah’s commitment to deepening ties during the Red Sea crisis. Under the reported deal, Ansar Allah would provide al-Shabab with arms and technical expertise in exchange for ramping up piracy attacks and collecting ransoms in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia’s coast.1 Considering al-Shabab’s cooperation with Somali pirates, in which the former reportedly receives a 20 percent share of ransoms, the Ansar Allah–al-Shabab partnership likely involved using pirates to maximize maritime disruptions.2 The United States’ fear is that Ansar Allah’s weapons deliveries could provide it with a new financing stream, while giving al-Shabab access to more sophisticated arms.
Iran also has longstanding contacts with al-Shabab. In 2017, the IRGC’s Quds Force allowed the group to circumvent United Nations sanctions by using Iranian ports as transshipment points to reexport charcoal, generating revenues. Iran has also reportedly armed and funded al-Shabab to target U.S. interests in the African Horn, including Kenya. While tangible evidence that Iran has played a role in facilitating Ansar Allah’s ties with al-Shabab is required, U.S. intelligence officials are investigating such a possibility. Guled Ahmed, a Somali scholar at the Middle East Institute, is more affirmative, saying, “Iran is at the epicenter of all of this.”3 Moreover, al-Qaeda’s de facto leader Seif al-Adl is allegedly being hosted by Tehran and views convergence between Sunni and Shia militants as necessary to focus on fighting Western countries.
Ansar Allah’s relationship with ISS, in turn, has evolved since at least 2021.4 The relationship initially focused on the transfer of small arms. Between 2015 and 2022, U.S.-designated ISS members Abdirahman Mohamed Omar and Isse Mohamoud Yusuf smuggled arms from Yemen, suggesting preexisting connections with Ansar Allah. This was driven both by the domestic needs of ISS, which operates in Somalia’s Puntland region, and Ansar Allah’s desire to bolster its revenues, especially after the lull in the Yemen conflict starting in April 2022. When the Gaza war began in October 2023, Ansar Allah sought to increase international pressure for a ceasefire by interdicting maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. Between November 2023 and May 2024, it reportedly sent representatives to northeastern Somalia to coordinate intelligence gathering and the geolocation of ships in the Gulf of Aden, filling blind spots in its radar coverage, in exchange for short-range suicide drones and technical training.5 The Somali Puntland Security Force (PSF) seized five such drones dispatched by Ansar Allah in August 2024, arrested seven individuals suspected of having links to ISS and al-Shabab, and in January of this year ISS claimed two drone attacks against the PSF. Ansar Allah’s relationship with ISS and the latter’s access to arms smuggling networks follow on from Ansar Allah’s ties with al-Shabab and the fact that in 2015, ISS leader Abdul Qadir Mumin formed ISS with defectors from al-Shabab, which he opposes.
While Ansar Allah is a Jarudi Zaydi Shiite group, it has behaved pragmatically in dealing with Sunni jihadi groups, as shown by its collaboration with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This relationship has involved the transfer of weapons to AQAP, the mutual provision of havens for each other’s members, and exchanges of prisoners, demonstrating that connections with al-Shabab and ISS are equally possible.
The ramifications of Ansar Allah’s deepening collaboration with al-Shabab and ISS are multifaceted and critical to global maritime trade, peace, and security. The parties have common interests, all of which are reshaping security dynamics in the African Horn, the southern Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, adding to the potential theaters of instability and complicating arms interdiction efforts. These dynamics have also increased Ansar Allah’s geopolitical footprint, from which Iran has benefited, giving both parties leverage over a major international sea-lane.
A primary interest of Ansar Allah, al-Shabab, and ISS is their exploitation of illicit networks, particularly arms and fuel trafficking networks from Iran. Iran, in turn, sees these groups as helping it to diversify access to financing channels, smuggling routes, and offshore support bases. Such activities have increased the three groups’ sources of revenues and operational capabilities.6 Specifically, Ansar Allah’s collaboration with Somali non-state actors has facilitated the flow of Iranian weapons and resources to and from Yemen, circumventing the United Nations arms embargo. Weapons transfers often follow a roundabout route. Larger ocean-faring ships leave Iran and travel into Kenyan or Tanzanian waters to avoid detection by international naval forces near the Gulf of Aden, before heading toward Somalia. Then, smaller boats departing from Somalia, using falsified documents, smuggle arms into Yemen, particularly through Ras al-Aara in Lahj Governorate.7 Arms dealers and brokers have also sought to transfer surface-to-air missile systems from Eastern Europe to Ansar Allah via Somalia.8
Somali non-state actors view Ansar Allah’s possession of disruptive conventional weapons and drone capabilities as an encouraging game-changing development.9 For Ansar Allah, in turn, the transfer of weaponry and training is part of a package that has increased the group’s revenues, expanded its influence, secured logistical assistance, and allowed Ansar Allah’s elevation in the Axis of Resistance. The IRGC, which is keen to undercut Western interests, seeks to counterbalance rivals such as the United States, the Gulf states, and Türkiye, and expand its reach into the African Horn. It “oversees the strategic direction of this transactional cooperation, with Ansar Allah acting as a sub-regional coordinator given its operational resilience during the Red Sea crisis and geographical proximity,” according to Yazeed al-Jeddawy of the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.10 The Quds Force, a member of which sits on Ansar Allah’s Jihad Council, the group’s highest executive body, supervises the weapons transfers.
For Ansar Allah, Somalia’s porous coastlines have become critical to ensuring that the group has access to Iranian supplies and Chinese equipment necessary for the growth of its Iranian-supported drone and missile program.11 Much equipment to Ansar Allah enters through Somalia and Djibouti. Smuggling routes to Yemen include the coastline around the ports of Hodeida, Salif, Ras Issa, and Mocha in Taiz Governorate, al-Shihr and Mukalla in Hadramawt Governorate, Balhalf and Bir Ali in Shabwa Governorate, Nashtun and Sayhut in Mahra Governorate, and, on the Somali side, the Bosaso port in Puntland and the coasts of Burua, Hobyo, Baraawe, Merca, and Qandala, as well as the Barbera port in Somaliland. To supply Ansar Allah, the IRGC relies on Somali piracy networks, al-Shabab, and arms dealers in Yemen and Somalia. Among those coordinating Ansar Allah’s operations in Somalia are Abu Mohammed al-Murtadha and Abu Ibrahim al-Hadi, who not only oversee trafficking deals but also the expansion of cooperation with the Quds Force.12
Second, Ansar Allah’s collaboration with al-Shabab and ISS has indirectly given Iran an opportunity to develop its strategic depth in Somalia and the African Horn and widen its latitude to shape the maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab Strait. During the Gaza conflict, this gave Iran significant leverage over the transportation of hydrocarbons and other goods into the Mediterranean and Europe. An October 2024 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen indicated that Ansar Allah was “evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast,” having transferred drones and missiles to Somalia. These attacks did not materialize, chiefly because Iran suffered setbacks in its conflict with Israel between July and December 2024, and feared this would lead to more sustained attacks against Iranian territory.
Ansar Allah’s ties with al-Shabab and ISS have also allowed the parties to diversify their tools of access to Somalia’s maritime areas, while creating deniability for their partners. For example, in November 2023, Ansar Allah’s Abdul-Malek al-Aajri claimed that his group had seized a vessel, the Central Park, when in fact it was Somali pirates who had done so in coordination with Ansar Allah, demonstrating their joint influence. Therefore, maritime attacks are increasingly involving multiple actors across the Gulf of Aden, giving Iran and Ansar Allah the means to disrupt Red Sea trade when advantageous.
Ansar Allah’s connections with groups in Somalia have also allowed it to receive information from the other side of the Gulf of Aden in order to strike ships. During the Gaza conflict, Ansar Allah persuaded al-Shabab, ISS, and Somali pirates to attack vessels and block their passage into the Red Sea in solidarity with the Palestinians. An October 2024 UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report concluded that a third of Ansar Allah’s attacks occurred in areas of the Gulf of Aden outside the group’s radar coverage, “suggesting that the Houthis received external assistance in identifying, locating and targeting the vessels.” Such information was probably provided by the IRGC’s spy ship MV Behshad, Russia, al-Shabab, ISS, pirates, or other Somali groups.
In March 2024, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi confidently expressed his intention to expand maritime operations toward the Indian Ocean and Cape of Good Hope, tacitly indicating the possibility of using other countries’ territory to organize direct or proxy attacks. The uptick in Somali piracy during Israel’s offensive in Gaza, alongside Ansar Allah’s disruption of Red Sea maritime traffic, was probably no coincidence, corroborating reports of a partnership between Ansar Allah and al-Shabab.
A third factor behind the collaboration of Ansar Allah, al-Shabab, and ISS, is their shared desire to broaden the front against the United States, Israel, and those African countries supporting the Americans, which they regard as rivals or enemies. The transfer of drones and surface-to-air missiles to al-Shabab, and suicide drones to ISS, has improved the asymmetrical warfare capacity of both groups. This has increased threat perceptions in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya (whose border region with Somalia is unstable), while increasing the groups’ ability to target regional security forces, including those from the Somali National Army, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, and U.S. Africa Command. The proliferation of drones has also created an environment in which Western resources may have to be reallocated elsewhere, with Ansar Allah likely hoping this may ease pressure on the group.
There are also domestic motivations for why Ansar Allah has deepened its relations with al-Shabab and ISS, posing potential risks for regional stability. Ansar Allah hopes to see its improved capabilities, networks, and resources in Somalia reflect positively on the trajectories of AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen against Ansar Allah’s adversaries. Its goal is to increase Sunni jihadi actions in Yemen, which would fuel instability in government-held areas, discrediting the Yemeni government both internally and internationally and deepening mistrust within the government camp.
Ansar Allah appears to be succeeding in this strategy. The UN recently issued a report indicating that al-Shabab “reportedly sent over a dozen operatives to AQAP to acquire operational expertise and knowledge including in unmanned aerial vehicle technology,”13 underscoring the potential for spillover. Given such convergence, AQAP has been increasingly focused on targeting Western interests and forces aligned with Yemen’s government and the Southern Transitional Council, especially since 2021. This encompassed employing booby-trapped drones in 2023. Like al-Shabab and ISS, Ansar Allah and AQAP view the Yemeni government as “pro-Western,” and during the Gaza war AQAP’s resolve to deepen its collaboration with Ansar Allah only increased. As for Iran, the weakening of central governments in Yemen and Somalia has created a vacuum allowing it to expand its leeway to intervene and pursue Tehran’s interests across the Gulf of Aden. This was especially important after the Iran-dominated Axis of Resistance was substantially weakened in the conflict with Israel between October 2023 and December 2024, raising Ansar Allah’s value in the axis and in Iran’s calculations.
The expansion of Ansar Allah’s relationships with Somali non-state actors resonates with Iranian foreign policy objectives in the African Horn. Iran, whose Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nasser Kanani, has described Africa as a “continent of opportunities,” has been revising its African Horn strategy in recent years, restoring diplomatic ties with Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia in 2023–2024. Ansar Allah’s footprint in Somalia is a symptom of Iran’s engagement in the African Horn. Furthermore, Ansar Allah’s focus on regional smuggling networks is expected to increase now that the United States again designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization in February 2025 and imposed sanctions on seven of its leaders implicated in smuggling and arms procurement.
The IRGC, mindful of the strategic implications Ansar Allah’s actions have had on global maritime trade and security, has been reinforced in its belief in the importance of having sway in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and toward the Cape of Good Hope. As Iran aims to project power throughout the region and beyond, its aim is to be able to have an impact on maritime developments far from its shores. Polarization, conflict, poverty, fragmentation, and corruption will remain enabling conditions for such an ambition in the medium term. But whether the contrary ideological objectives of Sunni and Shiite jihadi groups will end up dividing the Iranians and Ansar Allah from al-Shabab and ISS, despite their shared anti-Western militancy, remains to be seen.
This publication was produced with support from the X-Border Local Research Network, a program funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
On March 4, Jon Alterman spoke with Renad Mansour, senior research fellow and director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House, and Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, about the resilience of Iranian networks in the Middle East. Their discussion builds upon a recent Chatham House report Renad co-wrote on the topic. The following episode is a slightly condensed version of their conversation. You can find a link to the video of the complete discussion below.
This video highlights the Community-Based Participatory Methodology (CBPR) and Community-Driven Research approach developed by the Center for Peace and Justice (CPJ) at BRAC University. It will explore how this innovative approach was initially pioneered in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, focusing on refugee governance, and later adapted for new research in Jessore, Bangladesh, addressing critical issues of climate change, migration, and fragility along the Bangladesh-India borderland.
“The war rages just across the border, while we endure sleepless nights in the refugee camps of Bangladesh,” recounts a 30-year-old Rohingya man, who hides in nearby villages to evade forced conscription by armed groups.
Myanmar’s civil war has crossed international borders. As we write this, Rakhine State in Myanmar, the ancestral homeland of the Rohingyas, is undergoing a seismic transformation. Since the collapse of a ceasefire in November 2023, Myanmar’s military junta and the Arakan Army (AA) have fought an intense war over the future of Rakhine State, within which the Rohingya were caught in the crossfire. The subsequent year of fighting has led to the death of more than 1,300 people, mass displacement, and a new territorial order. In 2024, AA made substantial territorial gains and now controls most of Rakhine state, including the entire border with Bangladesh. These dramatic shifts in power cast a long shadow over the already uncertain future of the Rohingya in Myanmar. The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh’s camps have also been drawn into the escalating war – turning spaces of refuge into an extended battlefield. The renewed transnationalisation of conflict has changed the patterns of gendered violence in the camps, manifesting itself in new refugee movements, the proliferation of Rohingya armed groups, forced conscription campaigns and the imposition of a morality driven and culturally inscribed masculinity, and high prevalence of sexualised violence against women and girls.
Escalating violence has exposed the population in Rakhine to new threats from multiple sides. Extrajudicial killings, arson, rape, and other severe human rights violations against the Rohingya have been reported. A new wave of displacement followed as approximately 80,000 Rohingya sought refuge in Bangladesh in recent months. As of February 2025, the official figure of Rohingya living in the world’s largest refugee camp surpasses one million. These camps have only basic infrastructure, and the rights of the ‘Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals’, which is the official label for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, are minimal. They lack livelihood options and are almost totally dependent on humanitarian aid.
The refugee camps in Bangladesh have become sites of violent power struggles among armed groups, most notably the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, Arakan Rohingya Army, and Islami Mahas. These groups have created a climate of fear among refugees. They informally control the camps as ‘night governments’ and operate with near impunity both within the camps and in the wider Bangladesh-Myanmar borderland.
Since early 2024, the Myanmar military, desperate to maintain control, had resorted to forcibly recruiting Rohingya men and boys in Rakhine, exploiting their vulnerability and statelessness. The armed groups active in Bangladesh’s camps also started to abduct Rohingya refugees to fight in Rakhine state. According to reports, over 5,000 male Rohingya were violently or voluntarily conscripted, trained in weapon use, and then sold to warring parties in Myanmar or became part of units of Rohingya armed groups actively engaged in combat. The conscriptions reveal a complex relation between refugeehood, masculinity, and nation-state formation as the armed groups created and instrumentalised societal expectations towards Rohingya men, particularly youth, who should demonstrate a “militarised masculinity” to protect their race, religion, and motherland. In this wake, Rohingya men themselves become highly vulnerable to violence, while patriarchal norms were reaffirmed and the social fabric in the Rohingya camps was transformed.
A representative of a humanitarian NGO working in Cox’s Bazar explained another tactic used by groups forcibly conscripting Rohingya men: “If the brother or father or the husband doesn’t want to go to Myanmar and fight, the groups threaten those families, particularly the daughters or wives. Basically, if the men don’t join, the women will be abducted and raped.” Rohingya women face threats and sexual abuse as leverage against their male relatives, but they also play a critical role in resisting abductions, hiding young men during recruitment sweeps or assisting their escape. Nonetheless, due to forced conscriptions, the deaths of fighters, and men’s onward movements (such as perilous sea journeys to Indonesia or Malaysia) many households in the camps are female-led, which amplifies women’s already existing vulnerabilities to violence.
These dynamics reveal the significance of the camp-border-nexus. The new power of both the Rohingya armed groups in Bangladesh and the Arakan Army in Myanmar rests on their mobility and networks on both sides of the border. Cross-border trafficking of licit and illicit goods, including drugs, forced recruitment, human smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom have become part and parcel of the transnational war economies that continue to fuel violence in both countries.
There is a need for a radically different way of looking at the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, especially if we are to understand its transnational manifestations and gendered nature. To date, the Bangladeshi government and international partners have viewed gender-based violence against Rohingya as a local humanitarian problem that mainly concerns women. While it is true that women and girls are most vulnerable, and most GBV incidents take place in the camps, this focus on violence against women and the site of the camps is too narrow. As sketched, new patterns of gendered violence have emerged, in which Rohingya men are the main targets, and which are clearly linked to armed groups’ cross-border entanglements. Addressing this transnational landscape of gendered violence and enhancing the protection of both Rohingya women and men is a challenge. Nevertheless, recent changes in Bangladesh’s policy, the formation of a Rohingya Task Force, and the upcoming UN summit on the situation of the Rohingya led by Bangladesh’s interim government, offer a rare opportunity to reset the official and humanitarian strategies that have been in place for almost a decade. The chance must not be missed to then also address the transnational roots of insecurity and gendered violence in this contested borderland.
