The renewable energy transition is crucial to mitigate climate change and enhance energy security. However, it also has a large material footprint because it depends on the mining of critical minerals. Local communities frequently resist such mining due to their impact on resource access, pollution, and livelihoods, leading to tensions with mining companies and governments. This blog explores why such tensions turn violent and what can be done to manage them peacefully.
When we think about the renewable energy transition, we think of solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries that help us to mitigate climate change and achieve energy security at the same time. By contrast, most of us are unlikely to associate the renewable energy transition with violent events, such as the police throwing white phosphorus bombs at local activists in Myanmar or with large-scale community protests in Ghana. But such events are closely tied to the renewable energy transition as well.
Renewable energy technologies have a large material footprint because they are highly reliant on so-called transition minerals (sometimes also termed critical minerals) like lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earths, and copper. The rise of solar, wind, and battery technologies resulted in a rapid growth in demand for these transition minerals. Most of this demand is met by the expansion of existing or the establishment of new mining sites, particularly in the Global South. Communities in the mining areas concerned about land-grabs, water scarcity, environmental pollution, and a range of other mining impacts often mobilize against the mine, resulting in (usually non-violent) conflicts. Some studies estimate that such resistance results in over 4,500 mining conflicts globally every year.
Transition mineral conflicts can take vastly different forms. In Myanmar, for instance, local communities protested against land grabbing, air pollution, and livelihood losses associated with the expansion of the Monywa Letpadaung Copper Mine between 2010 and 2014. The conflict escalated quickly into verbal abuse and physical altercations. Protestors blocked the road to the mine and allegedly engaged in vandalism and verbal threats. In 2012 and again in 2014, state security forces conducted violent crackdowns of protests camps, resulting in one death and over one hundred injuries.
By contrast, conflicts around the proposed extraction of bauxite in the Atewa Forest in Ghana remained less intense. Local communities, the mining company (SinoHydro), and the government strongly disagreed on the mining projects, but carried out their struggle through lawsuits, electoral campaigns, and lobbying. No (threats of) physical violence were involved.
Contrasting these two cases of transition mineral extraction and comparing them with other mining sites across the Global South reveals at least two relevant insights.
The first insight is that transition mineral mining can result in intense and even violent conflicts, with adverse impacts on political stability, human rights, and supply chain security. The Monywa Letpadaung Copper Mine, which saw intense local resistance and repressive violence by security forces, is a case in point. Even in politically stable and democratic countries like Chile, the government has deployed the military police to monitor (and presumably also to intimidate) anti-mining protestors in the Putaendo Valley. In this sense, and despite their association with positive outcomes like climate protection and energy security, transition minerals are not different from other natural resources. For example, Oil extraction has been accompanied by massive state and company violence in Nigeria.
However, just as the link between oil and conflict is no one-way street, transition mineral mining does not always lead to intense struggles. The non-violent and even sometimes cooperative relations between the communities, the mining company, and the state in the Atewa Forest in Ghana are a case in point. Another example would be the Cerro Verde Copper Mine in Peru, where the surrounding communities and the mine owner (Freeport-McMoRan) negotiated in good faith and did not engage in violent activities. Eventually, the agreed on an expansion of mine in 2012 under the condition that the mining company would construct a wastewater treatment plant to address local water insecurity.
The second insight is that political culture and polarization are important for how transition mineral conflicts play out. On first glance, the violent Monywa Letpadaung conflict and the much more peaceful Atewa Forest conflict have a lot in common; the mining was an intense threat to local livelihoods, local communities received a lot of support from civil society actors, the (proposed) mine was run by a Chinese, state-owned company, and the mining was deeply tied to the interests of political elites (in Myanmar, the government co-operated the mine, while in Ghana, then-President Akufo-Addo conceived bauxite mining as crucial for his “Ghana Beyond Aid” political vision).
Yet, upon closer look, significant differences between mining projects become apparent. These are closely related to the political culture and levels of polarization. In Myanmar, an authoritarian government and a culture of impunity among security forces undermined trust in state institutions by the local communities, while also facilitating disproportionate violence by the police. Ghana, by contrast, is a stable democracy. Furthermore, the president supporting the Atewa Forest Mine (Nana Akufo-Addo) had close ties to the region, which facilitated mutual trust and a desire for non-confrontational means of conflict. Likewise, the Atewa region has been home to artisanal gold mining and agriculture for hundreds of years, meaning there is an established (even if still sometimes tense) culture of co-existence between both industries. By contrast, communities have complained about the Monywa Letpadaung Mine and its adverse impacts at least since 1996 and have felt that the state has always ignored their concerns.
To conclude, research demonstrates that not only climate change itself but also climate change mitigation measures like the renewable energy can be a major source of local tensions and even of political violence and instability. However, if designed in a conflict-sensitive way, the renewable energy transition can occur in a peaceful and just way.
First and foremost, this requires an early, inclusive, transparent, and open-ended consultation with the local communities affected by the mining activities. Government, shareholders, and mining companies must also watch their investments and avoid contexts where mining is associated with intense tensions, local resistance, and human rights violations. This is also a long-term investment into supply chain security, given that once mining conflicts occur, a quarter of all projects suffer from (costly) delays and cancellations. Finally, more efforts need to go into the monitoring of mining conflicts and into researching strategies for conflict-sensitivity in such contexts.
This blog was originally published on the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute (PRIF) website.
Event Note: The topic of this Blogpost will further be discussed on November 18 in the following XCEPT Webinar: “Critically insecure? Critical minerals in the context of geopolitical competition, social conflict and environmental sustainability”. Moderated by Tobias Ide, Daryl Bosu, Joel Watson, Zung Ting, Ramon Balcazar and Shahila Perumalpillai will discuss how states, companies and civil society navigate the tensions between securing critical mineral supply chains, protecting the environment and upholding social rights.
In this episode of KCL Department of War Studies podcast, Dr Nafees Hamid speaks with Dr Iain McGilchrist about how the brain’s left and right hemispheres attend to the world in fundamentally different ways. They explore how shifts in hemispheric dominance have shaped trust, institutions and the rise and fall of civilisations throughout history, and what this means for how governments, mediators and practitioners build, and lose, legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected settings today.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Soundcloud
This blog from King’s College London features a personal reflection by Maya Yamout, Vice President of the Lebanese NGO Rescue Me and a survivor of the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, six years after the disaster. Drawing on both her lived experience and her professional work in conflict and violence prevention, she argues that the explosion remains an ongoing crisis due to the lack of accountability for those responsible. She reflects on the lasting physical and psychological impacts on survivors, the role of civil society in preserving public memory and demanding justice, and the wider consequences of impunity for trust in state institutions and social cohesion.
This interview with King’s College London researcher Dr Rajan Basra explores the motivations behind jihadist hostage-taking during the 2014 Arsal hostage crisis in Lebanon. Drawing on interviews with families of 30 hostages, the discussion challenges conventional assumptions that kidnappings are driven solely by strategic goals such as ransoms or prisoner exchanges. Instead, it highlights the role of revenge, power and status in shaping the behaviour of militant groups and their members. The interview offers valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners working on hostage negotiations, civilian protection and conflict response, while also drawing attention to the often-overlooked experiences and support needs of victims’ families.
In this episode of Order from ashes, Peter Salisbury discusses the groundbreaking research behind Beyond the Axis, which examines how Yemen’s Houthi movement sources components and builds drones despite sustained international efforts to disrupt weapons supplies. The findings challenge conventional assumptions about arms trafficking and reveal how armed groups are adapting to an increasingly globalised war economy. Peter reflects on what this means for current conflicts in the Middle East, the limits of military responses, and how policymakers can better understand the evolving relationship between technology, supply chains and modern warfare.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
In this episode of Disorder, Jane Kinninmont is joined by Peter Salisbury to discuss how the Houthis learned to manufacture their own drones and missiles rather than simply receiving them from Iran, the outsized role China now plays in supplying the components that power this new generation of weapons, the fragile Saudi-Houthi truce since 2022, and what the changing economics of drone warfare mean for the future of arms control.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
Across conflict-affected borderlands, checkpoints are often treated as informal sites of taxation or obstruction along otherwise coherent trade routes. The TRACE project challenges this view.
Bringing together a set of comparative case studies from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, TRACE examines checkpoints as central political and economic institutions that shape how trade, authority and violence are organised. Rather than sitting on top of existing systems, checkpoints frequently constitute the infrastructure of circulation itself – enabling, regulating and transforming flows of goods, people and information.
TRACE explores the politics of circulation through detailed empirical research across diverse settings, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes, Libya, Yemen, Myanmar, West Africa, Afghanistan and South Sudan.
Across these cases, the research highlights three broad insights:
Together, these findings push beyond state-centric frameworks and offer a new way of understanding how power operates in conflict-affected economies.
Checkpoints, not territory: rethinking conflict | Peer Schouten
This policy brief challenges conventional understandings of conflict by showing that control over circulation – rather than territory – lies at the centre of many contemporary wars. Drawing on comparative research across Yemen, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes, South Sudan, Myanmar, and West Africa, it argues that checkpoints offer a critical but underexplored lens on conflict dynamics. In doing so, the brief highlights how these systems of control shape power, governance and everyday life, and sets out important implications for policy and programming.
Wars over checkpoints | TRACE researchers
This working paper is a collective effort taking stock of discussions during the TRACE workshop held in Entebbe, Uganda, from 19-21 November 2025. The paper unpacks the political and economic logic of checkpoints as central institutions of circulation. Drawing on comparative insights from DR Congo, Libya, Myanmar, South Sudan, Afghanistan, West Africa and Yemen, the paper advances nine theses that challenge conventional readings of roadblocks and reframe them as generative nodes of governance.
The TRACE working papers are designed not only as stand-alone contributions, but as building blocks for a broader comparative argument. Taken together, the research moves beyond describing checkpoint practices to explaining how checkpoint regimes emerge, evolve and reshape political and economic order. The following papers illustrate this collective effort, bringing together country-based studies led by individual authors whose work grounds the wider comparative insights.
On 18 June 2026, XCEPT hosted a briefing on how checkpoint economies shape conflict dynamics, governance, humanitarian access, and livelihoods across fragile and conflict-affected settings. Watch the recording of the briefing below.
The lives and livelihoods of local communities in the borderlands of the Lake Chad Basin are disrupted by both climate change and conflict, which are mutually reinforcing. Conflict undermines social cohesion and public trust and degrades the ability of communities to adapt to the effects of climate change. At the same time, climate change adds additional stress on food, land, and water security, reinforcing the political and socioeconomic conditions that drive armed conflict. In the context of a long history of marginalization, underdevelopment, and weak governance in the region, this conflux can drive people to turn to armed groups in search of alternative governance structures, economic incentives, and spiritual and social dignity and meaning.
Syria’s border with Jordan has long reflected the state of relations between the two neighbors. The border itself, delineated by France and Britain in October 1931, was tightly enforced only from 1970 onward, after the Black September crisis, when Syrian tanks entered Jordan in support of Palestinian militant organizations.
Since that time, Syria has opened and closed the Nassib-Jaber crossing—the main crossing point between the two countries—several times depending on the political relations between Amman and Damascus. The first decade of the century was something of a golden age for bilateral relations. Syria and Jordan cooperated on many fronts, especially in trade, which reached $674 million in 2007, up 166 percent from 2003. This can be seen in figures released by Jordan’s Department of Statistics, which provides the most detailed and up-to-date figures on the Jordanian economy, converted from Jordanian dinars to U.S. dollars at a rate of $1.41 per dinar. At the time, relations were such that Syria even sought to open a new crossing through Suwayda, alongside Nassib-Jaber and the crossing between Daraa and Ramtha.
In this episode of KCL Department of War Studies podcast, Dr Nafees Hamid speaks with Dr Craig Larkin, Dr Clara Voyvodic, and Maria El Sammak about the powerful and often divisive role of nostalgia in global politics.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or Soundcloud
In this episode of the NUPI podcast The World Stage, Cedric de Coning (NUPI) sits down with Louise Lieberknecht (formerly GRID-Arendal) who is one of the authors of a new report investigating the environmental dimensions of conflict in the Lake Chad region. The authors have examined how insecurity impacts the environment and how conflict dynamics are shaped by environmental factors.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
For all the attention on conflict zones, whether through political debate, social commentary, or a flood of hot takes on social media, there is often relatively little high-quality empirical data about the experiences of people living through the conflict. How exactly are people affected by conflict and violence? How do people remember and memorialise events? Does this hold across time, geographies, and sociodemographic groups? And what does all of this mean for policies regarding, say, justice and reconciliation? Here, qualitative interviews can give rich insight.
