Despite its recent announcement that it would reduce its military forces in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will remain the most powerful actor in the south of the country. The redeployment will allow the UAE to focus on its own interests by relying more heavily on local actors with whom it is aligned.
Emirati officials have stressed that the UAE is not withdrawing from Yemen. Rather it is drawing down its troop numbers and redeploying its forces to focus on counterterrorism. While these officials have said that this “was not a last-minute decision” and was discussed extensively with Riyadh, the redeployment has underlined disagreements between the UAE and Saudi Arabia over Yemen.
Saudi royal officials have reportedly intervened personally to discourage the Emiratis from going through with their decision. However, the UAE appears to have decided to free itself from the restrictions of the alliance. Since the beginning of military operations in March 2015 by Arab coalition forces, the Emirati and Saudi strategies have differed. The primary Saudi aim was to weaken the Houthis in order to restore to office the internationally recognized head of state, President ‘Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, expand Riyadh’s influence, and improve security along the Saudi-Yemeni border.
The Emiratis, in turn, have sought to gain influence in Yemen’s coastal areas and in the south of the country, in such a way as to strengthen their presence along shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the Mandeb Strait, toward the Horn of Africa. The growing rifts between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have led both countries to reinforce their presence in politically divided governorates not under Houthi control, where they have allied themselves with Yemeni factions and used them to further their respective aims.
Today, the UAE’s drawdown offers several advantages. It allows the Emirates freedom of maneuver to pursue its political objectives in Yemen, using local proxy forces. It also buys the UAE a margin of maneuver with regard to the Houthis and Iran. And it distances the UAE from the worst consequences of what is taking place on the ground in Yemen, while reducing casualties among Emirati forces, with the concomitant domestic benefits that this offers.
From the official perspective of UAE leaders, the war in Yemen ended some time ago. The crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed (effectively the man running the UAE’s foreign policy given the ill health of his brother, UAE President Khalifa bin Zayed) made this clear in a tweet in June 2016. “Our standpoint today is clear: war is over for our troops; we’re monitoring political arrangements, empowering Yemenis in liberated areas,” he tweeted.
The UAE has mainly sought to influence events in southern Yemen to undermine the Hadi-led government and prevent it from opposing UAE aims in the region. The Emiratis support one of the key southern separatist movements, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backing its demands for the independence of southern Yemen. Moreover, after former Yemeni president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh was killed by the Houthis in December 2017, the UAE assisted his nephew Tareq Saleh in establishing military units on Yemen’s western coast. The STC and Tariq’s forces are officially fighting the Houthis, but refuse to recognize Hadi’s legitimacy. The UAE has trained some 90,000 troops, whose salaries it also pays, providing it with an effective ground force as a means of military and political leverage.
Recently, the UAE unified all military forces in western Yemen, including those in the port city of Hodeidah, under Tareq Saleh. It apparently sought greater control over forces in the area to prevent any military escalation. Indeed, a source close to the Houthis noted that the Houthis and the UAE had reached an understanding to avoid any intensification of the fighting in western Yemen, otherwise the Houthis would target the UAE’s ports and airports in the same way that they have Saudi Arabia’s. Until now the UAE has not been attacked by the Houthis, even as pro-Houthi sources have alleged that the group has developed unmanned aerial vehicles with a range of 2,000 kilometers, putting the UAE within range.
The UAE’s behavior in western Yemen underlines that it is primarily focused on southern Yemen and the coast, with little interest in what happens in the country’s north. Given that the Houthis, in turn, have no strategic interest in southern Yemen, this has created room for the Houthis and Emiratis to find compromises. For the UAE, it no longer makes sense to involve itself in fighting over areas it regards as marginal to broader Emirati interests.
Emirati pragmatism has also been visible in the growing crisis between the United States and Iran. The UAE has been careful to avoid any escalation with Tehran. This was particularly visible when Iran or pro-Iran groups targeted four oil tankers near Fujairah last May. While the UAE and others later concluded that a “state actor” had likely been behind the attacks, the UAE was careful not to accuse Iran directly of having done so.
The drawdown of forces will also serve another purpose. It may improve the UAE’s image at a time when international humanitarian organizations have accused it of perpetrating human rights violations in Yemen. The international outcry over the humanitarian situation is rising, with even the U.S. Congress seeking to block arms sales to the Gulf nations. Therefore, the UAE is almost certainly calculating that by reducing its presence on the ground, it will be held less accountable for the catastrophe that Yemen has become.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
On May 13, the Nineveh Governorate’s council elected a new governor after the previous one, Naufal al-‘Aqub, resigned following accusations of corruption and mismanagement. The election was hotly contested, with many inhabitants of Mosul, Nineveh’s capital, opposed to the election of a governor not from the city. They despised ‘Aqub not only because of his poor performance, but also because he hails from the small rural town of Hatra.
An academic from Mosul encapsulated the mood in the city by saying that Mosul is dominated today by its periphery. He was referring to ethnic, religious, and tribal militias forming the larger part of the paramilitary groups active in Nineveh Governorate. Some of Mosul’s inhabitants still think that most of the Islamic State fighters who took over their city in 2014 and caused its destruction came from peripheral areas and were driven by hatred of urbanized Mosulians.
They blame the inhabitants of Tal A‘far for the disaster that followed Mosul’s takeover by the Islamic State. Indeed, several Islamic State leaders came from Tal A‘far, including Abdul-Rahman Mustapha al-Qadouli, who was widely seen as the second man in the group, and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, a prominent member of the Islamic State’s leadership, who was killed in 2015. That is why some Mosulians saw the Islamic State as empowering Nineveh’s rural or peripheral population, even though it had members from the city, many of whose inhabitants had joined another insurgent group, the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, dominated by Ba‘athists.
These local narratives are often overshadowed by the focus on ethnic, religious, and sectarian divisions in Nineveh, which the Islamic State’s rise further politicized and militarized. Unquestionably, the military conflict against the group solidified ethnoreligious boundaries, but it also led to the neglect of other divides, namely those separating the center and periphery. The collapse of Mosul’s hegemony over its periphery in recent years, whether as a result of the Islamic State’s takeover or the subsequent rise of victorious paramilitary groups, increased the fluidity in relations between Mosul and its environs.
Mosul is the most populated city in Nineveh and has been the heart of political, economic, and cultural power in the region. Over the centuries it developed a particular social and cultural identity, including a unique dialect and cuisine. Mosul’s historical ties with Syria, particularly Aleppo, and southern Turkey have shaped its collective self-perception. Sunni Islam and Arab nationalism have been essential in shaping Mosul’s identity, as opposed to the multiple non-Muslim and “heterodox” communities in adjacent areas.
As in other urban centers, tribal ties have often been weak in Mosul. Notable Sunni families from the Ottoman era played influential roles until the mid-20th century, when integration into the Iraqi state strengthened the role of Baghdad and its civil and military apparatuses. Osama al-Nujeifi, who became speaker of parliament between 2010 and 2014, and his brother Atheel, Mosul’s governor from 2009 until the city’s fall to the Islamic State, belong to a notable family and became Mosul’s leading politicians after 2003. Yet, the advent of the Islamic State and the subsequent conflict caused them both to lose much of their political capital, allowing new groups, often from outside Mosul, to fill the vacuum.
This was visible in the outcome of the vote for a new governor to succeed ‘Aqub. He was replaced by Mansour al-Mareed, who was born in Qayyara some 60 kilometers south of Mosul. His candidacy was supported by three groups not from the city—the ‘Ata Movement, led by Faleh al-Fayyad, the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces; a second group led by parliamentarian Ahmad al-Jubouri, a former governor of Salaheddin Governorate, and Khamis al-Khanjar, who is an influential politician and businessman from Anbar Governorate; and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). For many Mosulians, Mareed’s election was a case of outsiders intruding in their affairs, though some admitted it was made possible by the failure of the inhabitants to unite behind a cohesive political force.
Due to this perception of external interference, some politicians and professionals from Mosul have advocated, not for the first time, turning Nineveh into an autonomous region. Iraq’s constitution allows governorates to become federal regions. This demand was previously embraced by Atheel al-Nujeifi in 2012–2013, but was rejected by then-prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, whose dispute with Nujeifi was identified by an investigative parliamentary committee as a major cause of Mosul’s fall in 2014. The previous year, Maliki had countered Nujeifi’s demand by saying that his cabinet would divide Nineveh into four governorates—Mosul, Tal A‘far, Sinjar, and Sahal Nineveh. Yet, this never materialized.
Supporters of a new federal region in Nineveh think that if it gains more autonomy from Baghdad, this will reduce the influence of the Shi‘a-dominated government and Iran-backed groups. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Kurdish leadership in Erbil sympathized with the project and provided a platform for those advocating for an autonomous region. The KDP expects that if this were to come about, it would be easier for the Kurdistan Region to annex disputed areas in the governorate, such as Sinjar, Hamdaniyyya, Zamar, and Talkif.
Those who want Nineveh to become a federal region also believe that such a move would help Mosul consolidate its power as a regional center, strengthening its position vis-à-vis its periphery. Wanting to replicate the experience of the Kurdistan Region, they believe that Mosul will have at its disposal sufficient resources to revive its ties with Turkey and working relations with Kurdish areas, becoming the economic and cultural hub of northwestern Iraq.
However, current political realities do not make this likely. On the one hand, Nineveh receives most of its resources from Baghdad, which gives the central government leverage in defining the relationship between the two sides. On the other, as Faleh al-Fayyad has stated, the balance of power in Nineveh was drastically altered after the defeat of the Islamic State. Fayyad’s influence over Nineveh expanded following the appointment of a new governor from his ‘Ata Movement. Nor is Mosul’s desire to reassert its domination shared by the populations of surrounding areas. Non-Muslim minorities such as the Yazidis and Christians are longing for more autonomy and protection for their areas, not reintegration into Sunni-dominated Mosul, where they would have secondary status. Kurds are more inclined to be part of Kurdistan, while the Shi‘a prefer stronger ties with Baghdad. Rural and tribal Sunni Arabs in areas such as Rabi‘a, Hatra, and B‘aj are either indifferent or seeking to build influence in Mosul through alliances with the powerful Shi‘a militias or the KDP.
Nineveh is undergoing a long process of reconstitution that will continue to produce new winners and losers. Yet for now, those who adhere to a Mosul-centric perspective find themselves on the losing side. Even if the new governor and his administration do not subscribe to such a perspective, they will have to deal with the question of Mosul’s relations with its periphery. This will ultimately have implications for Nineveh’s relations with the rest of Iraq.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
Michael Young: You recently returned from Yemen. What were your main impressions during that visit?
Ahmed Nagi: I visited several governorates and saw the deep and devastating impact of the ongoing conflict on people’s lives. Though some places close to the front lines have suffered more than other areas, the consequences of the war have reached every corner in Yemen, even peripheral zones far from the conflict. However, the heavy cost is not only impacting civilians but also reshaping Yemen, creating a country that did not exist previously.
One of the main outcomes is that a war economy has emerged in the past four years, creating dynamics that only help to perpetuate the conflict. This includes the expansion of the black market for fuel, smuggling activities, the arms trade, and money laundering, among others. Such an economy has expanded because of the involvement of military and militia leaders in conflict areas, who are not only leading the fighting but also reaping the economic profits resulting from the war economy. Such a situation means that the warlords have an interest in continuing the conflict. The worse scenario for them would be if the fighting were to stop.
Another impression was that there has been a massive movement of people from area to area, creating new or vastly expanded urban areas. In the case of Maarib Governorate, for instance, a hub for the Houthis’ opponents, the population now stands at more than 1.5 million, compared to 400,000 before the conflict. Similarly, the city of Ibb, elsewhere in Yemen, has grown because many people in zones of fighting nearby fled to Ibb because of its relative safety.
The catastrophic humanitarian conditions across Yemen is the most difficult challenge that people are facing. Famine, malnutrition, disease, and difficult economic conditions have become the daily lot of civilians. A less visible disaster is the rising rate of illiteracy among children. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, there are around 2 million Yemeni children out of school. A generation of illiterate adults will only help to fuel future conflicts and create a class of Yemenis ripe for recruitment by warlords.
MY: Are there any signs that the campaign of Gulf Arab states against the Houthis is succeeding, or can succeed?
AN: It depends on what are the real goals of the Saudi-led coalition. If the declared purpose was restoring the legitimacy of President ‘Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and defeating the Houthi coup, the answer would be no. On the contrary, Hadi, who authorized the coalition to intervene in Yemen, is unable to return to the country and his legitimacy has disintegrated in the south, where a separatist movement is being backed by the United Arab Emirates, a leading member of the Arab coalition. Meanwhile, despite losing some areas, the Houthis are still in control of most of the northern areas of Yemen
It is worth noting that public sentiment at the beginning of the campaign was mostly in favor of Hadi’s government and supported the Saudi-led coalition. However, people are now fed up with the coalition’s practices and the devastation it has wrought. The coalition’s strategy during the last four years has been characterized more by failure than success.
MY: On the subject of the Houthis, you recently wrote an article for Carnegie in which you described their ability to assume a range of identities in pursuit of their political agenda. What did you mean?
AN: There has been a common argument that the rise of the Houthis was the result of Iranian support. That is partly true, but it was not the main cause. What I tried to highlight in the article was the ability of the Houthis to periodically adapt, or shift, their identity in such a way as to exploit longstanding grievances in Yemen, as well as rifts among political parties or regional disputes. This enabled the Houthis to recruit fighters, defeat opponents, and build alliances. Such dynamics played a significant role in transforming the Houthi movement from a small group in some villages of Sa‘da Governorate into the de facto authority controlling most of Yemen’s northern areas.
MY: What steps did the Houthi movement take to cement its control over state institutions and areas under its control?
AN: Since taking over the capital San‘a in September 2014, the Houthis have imposed an iron grip over state institutions by appointing Houthi supervisors (mushrifoun), most of whom are personally loyal to the leader of the movement ‘Abdul-Malak al-Houthi. These supervisors not only oversee the performance of state institutions, but also ensure that these institutions work in favor of the movement’s interests. The network of supervisors is hierarchical and is connected with the office of the Houthi leader. Moreover, the Houthis replaced high-level personnel in state institutions with their own members to ensure that they would have full control over state bodies in areas that they govern.
This has allowed the Houthis to create their own economic system. They have been able to impose complete economic control over state institutions, drawing on their resources, as well as gaining revenues from the black market and other businesses benefiting from the war. Despite such revenues, the Houthis have refused to pay salaries to public-sector employees, because they are spending the money on their fighters at the front. Consequently, state institutions have been completely paralyzed.
MY: The Houthis recently gained a degree of international recognition through their participation in United Nations-brokered peace talks. What are likely to be the movement’s main demands in any political settlement to end the war in Yemen?
AN: The Houthis’ ultimate aim is to revive the Zaidi Imamate, which was overthrown by the republican revolution of 1962. However, the movement has adopted interim demands at every stage in which it has been involved, always escalating its claims subsequently. Unlike its demands in 2014 when the Houthis took over San‘a, they consider themselves today to be a legitimate authority, at least in areas they control, and seek regional and international recognition for this through any deal. Nevertheless, even this seems to be an interim demand, because resurrection of the Zaidi Imamate is their objective.
