PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION IN AFGHANISTAN

XCEPT
CROSS-BORDER CONFLICT
EVIDENCE / POLICY / TRENDS

MODERN SCIENTIST GLOBAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

# TABLE OF FIGURES

TABLE OF TABLES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report identifies patterns of cross-border migration and drivers of migration in Afghanistan to frame policy recommendations for donor and government agencies. It is based primarily on data from the *2021 Survey of the Afghan People* (SAP). Findings are organized under broad 'push' factors that encourage migrants to move: political, economic, environmental, and demographic and social (see the framework, **Figure 1**).

For decades, Afghanistan's population has endured prolonged and severe conflict, population displacement, poverty, health crises, and human rights abuses.[1] The country is also particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts given a complex interplay of geographical and socio-political factors, with the majority of Afghans relying on agriculture for their livelihoods.[2] In mid-2021, Afghanistan faced the worst drought in nearly three decades. It affected a population already suffering from severe and protracted conflict which culminated in the collapse of the Afghan government and takeover by the Taliban. Over 700,000 conflict-related internal displacements were recorded in 2021, the majority of them women and children.[3]

By early 2022, 80% of the country was suffering from serious drought, over 50% of the population was facing acute food insecurity, and 97% of the population was at risk of universal poverty.[4] Increased internal displacement and cross-border migration led to a mounting strain on limited resources, livelihood opportunities, health, and education. The positive effect of a projected decrease in conflict-driven displacement throughout 2022 will be partly undermined by the impacts of drought and economic shock, and by people moving in response to the change of government rather than directly as a result of conflict. In early 2022, the total number of internally displaced people countrywide was estimated at 3.4 million, while over two million Afghans were registered as refugees in Pakistan, Iran, and other countries.[5]

Figure 1: Framework for push factors impacting migration in Afghanistan

Adapted from the push factor framework of Albrecht, Rude & Stittender (2021)[6]

Findings:

- **The 2021 SAP found that insecurity was the primary reason Afghans wished to leave the country.** Of the 18,362 respondents from across Afghanistan, 24.3% were concerned for their family's safety in 2021, 44.7% expressed a desire to leave the country, and 84.3% cited insecurity as the main factor influencing their desire to migrate. Fear for family safety was positively associated with a desire to migrate, with the odds of wanting to leave due to security fears increasing from 15% in 2019 to 28% in 2021. Furthermore, experience of violence was positively associated with a desire to leave the country in 2019 and 2021.

- **There is wide regional disparity across Afghanistan in the desire to leave**. Respondents who wanted to migrate were more concentrated in northern provinces, with the highest proportion for 2021 observed in Kunduz at 65.1%, and the lowest proportion in Hilmand at 9.8%. The top reasons for leaving were security followed by unemployment and weak government, while the top reasons to stay were Afghan identity, being restricted from leaving, and poor prospects elsewhere.

- **Consistent with previous literature, we found that younger, unmarried men were significantly more likely to want to leave Afghanistan.** While the top three reasons to leave given by men and women were the same, a greater proportion of women cited insecurity while a greater proportion of men named unemployment. People from urban areas showed greater interest in migrating: In 2021, almost 50% of those living in urban areas had a desire to migrate, while under 40% of those in rural areas did so.

- **Health status did not emerge as a strong determinant of a desire to migrate; however, family health has been worsening for many respondents.** Over one-third of respondents reported worsening family health in the past year.

- **The presence of private higher educational institutions (such as pay-for-enrollment universities) in a locality is associated with more out-migration.** Those receiving education and training at private universities may be seeking more advanced opportunities and hence may choose to migrate, or may have greater access to the opportunity to migrate. A lack of educational opportunities was the most-cited problem (39%) among women.

- **Levels of infrastructure and development affect people's desire to migrate.** The 2021 SAP data shows that better water resources reduce the wish to leave; more people want to leave areas with worse access to drinking water, while having an irrigation project implemented in the nearby area reduced the desire to migrate. Having agricultural projects implemented in one's area was associated with 14% lower odds of expressing a desire to leave. Meanwhile, the reconstruction of roads or bridges was positively associated with a desire to migrate (likely due to increased accessibility), while the opening of new factories was negatively associated (perhaps due to increased employment opportunities).

- **Diminished employment opportunities and financial situation lead to a greater willingness to migrate.** Among those who wished to migrate, 64% reported worse employment opportunities, and 47% reported a worse financial situation.

- **People with open beliefs about women's political participation are more likely to want to leave the country.** Statistical analysis of SAP data indicated that a belief in women's ability to vote independently was an important determinant of migration. Over 92% of respondents who wished to leave the country felt women should be allowed to vote. Similarly, higher proportions of those who wish to leave felt that women should decide their vote for themselves (61%) and that political leadership should be based on merit (58%).

- **Low confidence in leadership and government is associated with a desire to migrate.** A lack of confidence in religious leaders and community shuras/jirgas were identified as the top determinants of the desire to leave in 2019 and 2021. Furthermore, a lack of confidence in the elections commission, community development councils, government ministers, provincial councils, and the parliament, as well as wider dissatisfaction with democracy, were all among the top determinants of migration in 2019 and 2021.

Recommendations:

- **Develop policies and programs that generate long-term and reliable economic opportunities:** Unemployment, a weak economy, and poor livelihoods are all linked to migration, particularly among men. Where possible, international donors and humanitarian agencies should prioritize initiatives that provide income-earning opportunities for Afghans, including those who are settled in border areas and transient populations. Cash for work and other social benefit programs are valuable short-term solutions. Long-term programs should consider the volatile Afghan context and incorporate 'stay' contingency mechanisms or incentives as a means to offer economic support to families in times of crisis. These may include higher wages or alternative employment opportunities when migration conditions ripen.

- **Ensure a secure and safe environment for migrants and resettled populations:** Insecurity is the dominant concern among Afghans who desire to migrate. While humanitarian and development partners may have less control over national security, efforts can be made to ensure the most vulnerable including children, women, unaccompanied minors, and marginalized groups are safe during periods of movement and resettlement. Moreover, humanitarian agencies can promote the protection of at-risk communities and support peace dialogue or reconciliation.

- **Prioritize vulnerable, at-risk populations such as women and girls:** It is estimated that as many as 16.2 million vulnerable Afghans including displaced people, returnees, and refugees need protection assistance, and only just over one in four of them (4.5 million) is reached with current initiatives.[7] Additionally, women and girls are disproportionately impacted by gender-based violence stemming from migration. Protection of the most vulnerable is critical during migration and is particularly important in the Afghan context where cultural approaches to girls and women, diverse ethnicities, and young populations compound and exacerbate risks among transient populations. Appropriate segregation, close monitoring and supervision of at-risk groups, and availability of health and social services for victims are all viable solutions for policymakers to consider.

- **Rebuild trust between government entities, communities, and local NGOs through active engagement with stakeholders (including displaced populations) and by leveraging community councils in migration planning:** Trust is critical to reducing incidents of violence, and to sustainable peacebuilding and community stabilization. Lack of confidence in community and government leadership is among the main drivers of migration, and policies should work on rebuilding lost confidence. The existing jirga system (of community decision-making and consensus-building councils), commonplace in rural Afghan areas, could be mobilized to foster trust and confidence between community stakeholders. Engaging community members in decisions on issues such as migration (for example regarding returnees), infrastructure, and working with NGOs in transparent ways can build trust. In addition, generating feedback and grievance redress mechanisms can be an important way to foster two-way communication between community members and governments, local NGOs, and other stakeholders.

- **Invest in infrastructure, development, and climate-resilient agriculture:** Improvements to drinking water, irrigation, agriculture, and other local development initiatives may prove powerful protective factors against migration. Development partners, policymakers, and NGOs should continue to prioritize such investments. In addition, early warning surveillance in areas frequently affected by extreme climate events would enable effective tracking and support coordinated responses. Community-led programs to develop wells and irrigation systems for agriculture could galvanize local employment and improve community cohesion.

- **Incorporate Afghan cultural norms while still upholding women's rights**: The 2021 data shows that the desire to migrate is linked to a lack of women's political participation, suggesting that women's empowerment and rights should also be a focus of policies aimed at keeping Afghan families in their communities. Culturally sensitive and context-specific solutions are critical. Efforts to increase knowledge of women's roles in societies and the positive impact it will have on families and communities among gatekeepers and protectors of women in Afghanistan are imperative. Beyond the formal education system, efforts may be more successful if communicated through mosques and community councils such as jirgas. Gender-segregated opportunities for women to participate in employment and other roles in society may also be successful in the short and longer term.

- **Further research:** Reliable data, where possible disaggregated by province, age, gender, and socioeconomic status, remain vital as a basis for humanitarian and development interventions in a challenging context. Large-scale surveys will continue to be relevant where feasible, along with smaller-scale work or qualitative assessments that shed light on specific issues including the position of women and girls and related public attitudes. The impact of climate change in Afghanistan requires further study to improve understanding of who is likely to be most affected and of the scope for developing appropriate climate-resilient solutions. Regarding migrant and transient populations, assessments of existing needs remain important. A review of Afghanistan's historical policies and programs for migrant groups would provide useful insights for new interventions.

Photo: The Asia Foundation

1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Government of Afghanistan in August 2021 and takeover by the Taliban resulted in political, economic, and social turmoil that has exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis. Today, Afghanistan is facing one of the worst humanitarian situations worldwide with more than 700,000 Afghans facing forced displacement and more than 5.5 million in protracted displacement domestically and internationally since the takeover.[8] Patterns of migration have changed considerably since the Taliban gained national power. Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations have rapidly outlined action plans that appeal for international funds to address the crisis.

This study assesses trends in the internal and external migration of Afghan people to inform current and future policy action in Afghanistan. It examines the reasons Afghans were considering leaving or staying in the country at a major crisis point in Afghanistan. Migrant needs are projected to increase in 2022. To improve access to essential services, sustain livelihoods, and protect the most vulnerable, it is important to understand migration patterns. Unless swift action is taken, the current migration crisis could further deteriorate.[9]

2. BACKGROUND

Migration within Afghanistan has been shaped and driven by decades of conflict since the 1980s. However, historical records have shown that Afghan migration to Iran and Pakistan, the two most frequent recent destinations for migrants, predates recent conflicts and has occurred for centuries.[10] The first accounts of mass migration due to conflict in Afghanistan's recent history resulted from the Soviet invasion in 1979. The subsequent war lasted nearly a decade, creating conditions that have caused over 5 million Afghans to flee to nearby Pakistan and Iran. In the decade after the war, conditions continued to drive migration. Political instability in Kabul, coupled with warring militias vying for power, entangled Afghanistan in sectarian violence.[11] As a result, the population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) rose, with 400,000 people housed in various camps in the border provinces.[12] The US invasion in 2001 ushered in a new decade of full-scale conflict. The scale of conflict led to an increasing number of IDPs in the country, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reporting up to 1.1 million Afghans internally displaced and projecting that upwards of 2.2 million could be internally displaced by the following year.[13] After the toppling of the Taliban government in 2001, displacement continued as conflict persisted. Other factors also forced people to move during this period. In 2005, land tenure issues caused displacement amongst returnees in Kabul and other regions. In addition, issues ensued from disputes between returnees and local populations.[14]

The post-Taliban era also marked a difficult transition for returnees to Afghanistan. By 2008, more than 5 million Afghans who had returned to the nation since 2002 were facing socioeconomic and reintegration challenges which contributed to secondary displacement. According to a survey conducted by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, out of the 453 returnees who explained why they did not return to their place of origin, 94.5% cited inadequate standards of living (e.g. lack of tenure and lack of access to water) and poor access to livelihoods.[15] A report by the Integrated Region Information Networks (IRIN) in 2007 also noted that returnees encountered difficulties reintegrating into their areas of origin. The report acknowledged the failure of a land distribution scheme by the Afghan government, where plots had been provided for 100,000 families yet only 6,000 households had moved into the designated areas. Inadequate basic services and limited livelihood opportunities were reported as the reasons.[16] Over the next decade, Afghanistan became one of the main sources of asylum seekers globally; in 2011 alone, over 39,000 Afghans sought asylum worldwide.[17]

Many of the causes of internal displacement and external migration persisted over the next decade. In the first half of 2018, Oxfam reported that 159,000 Afghans fled their homes due to conflict.[18] That same year, a survey found that 41% of respondents expressed a desire to migrate. Women and those aged 20-39 were especially likely to want to move.[19] In particular, a

deteriorating security situation driven by the resurgence of the Taliban significantly increased levels of migration in 2021. UNHCR reported tremendous new cross-border movement in January and February 2021, counting 780,000 Afghan migrants located in Iran and 1.4 million in Pakistan. UNHCR also noted that 116,403 Afghans sought asylum in Turkey during that period.[20] The grave humanitarian conditions that ensued in 2021 impacted migration for the remainder of that year and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) found that 5.5 million IDPs were recorded from August to November 2021, while 667,900 were newly displaced.[21] The most-reported community shocks within the country in 2021 were food price inflation, unemployment, and reduced income.

3. METHODOLOGY

This report is centered around the following questions:

- What policies/aids/interventions have been introduced since the Taliban's takeover and how did they inform migration?
- How have issues of migration and trends changed since the change in leadership?
- Is there any spatial heterogeneity in the desire to migrate from Afghanistan?
- What are the reasons Afghans would migrate or stay?

The main quantitative source for the report is the *Survey of the Afghan People* (SAP), a comprehensive, annual data-gathering exercise that in 2021 was conducted immediately preceding the Taliban's takeover. The SAP is the longest-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and opinions of adult Afghans. Since 2004, over 148,100 Afghan men and women have taken the survey, representing more than 400 districts, city nahias (municipal districts), and towns and villages across the country.

For this report, a literature review was conducted using the following search terms: Migration OR migrant OR IDP OR displace* OR refugee AND Afghanistan. All articles within the last 12 years (2010+) were included. This review included grey literature from the websites of UN agencies, NGOs, and other international actors. The researchers also conducted a policy review of relevant government and NGO initiatives in Afghanistan.

All policies were organized into a framework outlining implementation dates, stakeholders, impacts, and gaps/challenges. Only policies that were: 1) launched within 6 months of the start of the research period in early 2022; 2) currently active; and 3) led by NGOs, were ultimately included to frame our policy recommendations for addressing the migration crisis in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the migration push factors identified by Albrecht and colleagues (2021) were used to frame our analyses and recommendations.[22]

Based on the 2021 SAP data, the analysis for this report used ArcGIS Pro 2.9.2 to generate GIS-based choropleth maps on the percentage of respondents in each province who had the desire to migrate or stay, along with geo-located bar charts on each map showing the percentage of respondents in each province who answered one of three reasons to stay and three reasons to leave. Mapping was undertaken using the entire 2021 SAP sample to highlight geographical variation, and also using a subsection of interviews from before and after July 20. This date was the midpoint of data collection, ensuring a sufficient sample size for provincial-level analysis, and also as a means to compare sentiments before and during the Taliban takeover of the country.

Furthermore, descriptive analyses were conducted to disaggregate those wanting to leave by gender, age, and urban or rural residence for 2021, while time-series analyses were performed to show change over time by gender (2011-2021) and by urban or rural residence (2015-2021). Logistic regression was applied to both the 2021 SAP data and earlier data from the 2019 SAP survey to investigate the determinants of migration and their effect on migration changes over time. Standardized coefficients were calculated and ranked accordingly to assess the magnitude of the significant predictor variables.

In addition, machine learning techniques were used to answer the same question of determinants of migration, thus strengthening findings. Researchers employed the Random Forest Classifier to identify the top predictors of the desire to migrate by employing feature importance, assigning scores ranking the relative importance of each variable in the model. This method combines predictions from multiple machine learning algorithms to achieve more accurate prediction.

For the 2021 SAP itself, data were collected from July 10 to August 2, 2021, and 18,362 participants were asked questions on issues of security, peace and reconciliation, the economy, governance, women's rights, the withdrawal, and the Taliban.[23] Respondents were aged 18 and older, 49% male, and 51% female, representing all major and most minor ethnic groups

from 33 provinces. The 34th province, Ghazni, was not included in 2021 due to insecurity at the time of fieldwork.

The 2021 SAP survey was fielded entirely via face-to-face random selection. The 2020–2021 population estimates provided by the former National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) provided accurate estimates for urban and rural populations at the district level of Afghanistan. The Asia Foundation added additional quality-control measures through independent, third-party monitoring of the central training, provincial trainings, and fieldwork of the interviewing teams. In total, 35% of interviews were subject to some form of back-check or quality control. To verify that fieldwork was conducted at the correct locations as specified in the sampling plan, interviewers collected

GPS coordinates for most sampling points. These were compared to GPS coordinates for selected villages drawn from NSIA lists.

Respondents were aged 18 and older, 49% male, and 51% female, representing all major and most minor ethnic groups from 33 provinces were interviewed. In 2021, the 34th province, Ghazni, was not included due to insecurity at the time of fieldwork. The final, unweighted sample consisted of 30% urban households and 70% rural households. Interviews ranged from 15 to 120 minutes, with the average paper interview taking 43 minutes, and the average tablet interview taking 40 minutes. The complex margin of error at a 95% confidence interval with p=.5 is ±1.1% for the probability sample.

4. KEY FINDINGS

Historical and Current Policy Action

Given the historical and current patterns of cross-border migration to and from Afghanistan, we summarized key policy initiatives in **Box 1**. While policies before the 2021 takeover may no longer be directly relevant, they provide useful insight for Afghanistan's new government and development agencies. Further information can be found in the Appendix.

Several NGOs proposed action plans in 2021 and 2022 to address immediate needs, and these are also summarized in **Box 1**. IOM's Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries

estimated that 500,000 Afghans would be displaced in 2022 due to drought, lack of livelihood, and other shocks, and there would be approximately 785,000 refugees and cross-border returnees.[24] The Afghan Red Crescent Society, alongside other Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, is in the midst of an ongoing 2-year emergency appeal that has already provided tens of thousands of food parcels, hygiene kits, and household kits. Moreover, as of January 31, 2022, more than 42 mobile health teams had reached 527,475 people including IDP households.[25]

Photo: The Asia Foundation

Patterns and determinants of cross-border migration in Afghanistan

Box 1: Past and Current Policies Supporting Migrants of Afghanistan

In February 2014, the **National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons** was launched, aiming to provide guidance on current and future internal displacement in Afghanistan, protect the rights of IDPs, address their urgent and long-term needs, reduce the risk of further displacement, create an action plan at the national, provincial, and local levels, and clarify the roles of various ministries and stakeholders to ensure coordinated management of internal displacement.[26]

The **Comprehensive Voluntary Repatriation and Reintegration Policy** was released in August 2015. Among other elements, it aimed to launch an Enhanced Voluntary Return and Reintegration Package to incentivize return and ease re-establishment by providing cash for six months, to continue the voluntary repatriation mechanisms already in place (e.g. cash assistance, vaccinations and health checks, vital information on services), and to increase the flexibility of programs and interventions to address urban and rural settings.[27]

Similarly, the **Policy Framework for Returnees and IDPs** of June 2019 also addressed the needs of returnees in addition to IDPs. However, this policy emphasized sustainable solutions to promote self-reliance, for example providing assistance for seeking employment and protecting the rights of IDPs, returnees, and other citizens. The Policy Framework for Returnees and IDPs also aimed to assist host communities and instill a consistent documentation and registration system.[28]

Unlike other policies which focused on IDPs and returnees, the **National Labour Migration Strategy (2016-2018)** aimed to facilitate the temporary migration of skilled workers abroad for overseas employment opportunities, including promoting cost-effective remittance inflows, maintaining a reliable database on labor migration, and ensuring full legal documentation of the status of migrant workers.[29]

Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, several initiatives have been launched:

☛ The **IOM Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries**. In the short term, IOM aims to strengthen preparedness and address urgent humanitarian needs. In the medium term, IOM prioritizes prevention

measures to address migration challenges and reduce the impact of associated crises (e.g. engage in peacebuilding, improve health capacity, and reduce barriers to mobility). In the long term, resilience will be prioritized, including promoting sustainable development and socioeconomic recovery by improving institutional and community capacities. The plan will support governments and target over 3.6 million affected people: refugees, returnees, migrants, IDPs, host communities, and other vulnerable individuals. Stated financial requirement: US$589,771,000.[30]

☛ The **Afghanistan – Humanitarian Crisis Emergency Appeal** of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies aims to address needs stemming from a combination of shocks and humanitarian crises. This includes health care and relief supplies for the most vulnerable populations such as IDPs and those experiencing food insecurity. Funds will also support long-term recovery and preparedness. Approximately 560,000 individuals (80,000 households) will be assisted, requiring approximately US$36 million.[31]

☛ The **WHO Afghanistan Emergency Plan** aims to address immediate humanitarian needs and develop long-term support for the health system. This includes Health Cluster coordination, continuity of health services, life-saving medical supplies, COVID-19 response, and recovery, preparation for potential disease outbreaks, urgent trauma needs, and the health needs of IDPs. Stated financial needs: US$ 38,450,000.[32]

☛ The UN's **Humanitarian Response Plan – Afghanistan,** which will launch in September 2022, will require US$4.44 billion. It aims to reach 22.1 million people in need of life-saving humanitarian support. This includes providing safe and equitable access to shelter, health, education, psychosocial, and protection-related support. Stated challenges to implementation include security threats, restricted participation of female humanitarian staff, access constraints (e.g. active conflict and movement restrictions), and reduced operational capacity (e.g. temporary halting of humanitarian programs).[33]

Migration in Context

Geospatial maps reveal how respondents across Afghanistan's provinces felt about migration. **Figure 2** presents the percentage of respondents answering that they would stay in the country in 2021, along with the percentage of respondents who gave one of three reasons to stay: Afghan identity, restricted from leaving, and poor prospects elsewhere. Overall, the highest proportion of respondents stating they would stay in Afghanistan was in Hilmand Province, and the overwhelming majority cited Afghan identity as their reason for staying. The lowest proportion who wanted to stay was found in Kunduz, at only 30.9%, followed by Sari Pul (31.8%), and Takhar (33.9%) (**Figure 2**).

Figure 2: Respondents who would stay in Afghanistan

Percentages reflect the proportion of respondents who responded no to the question "Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?" Bar charts reflect the top 3 reasons for staying.

Figure 3 presents the percentage of respondents desiring to leave the country. The top three reasons given were insecurity, unemployment, and weak government. In line with what was found in the spatial pattern of respondents who desired to stay, respondents who desired to migrate were more concentrated in northern provinces, with the highest proportion for 2021 observed in Kunduz at 65.1%, and the lowest proportion in Hilmand at 9.8% (**Figure 5**).

The southern provinces of Hilmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, and Gazni were severely affected by conflict from around 2003 to 2009, while intense conflict arose elsewhere in Afghanistan over the past decade, including many northern provinces.[34] The SAP data reflects

these tensions as a greater proportion of those living in northern provinces wanted to migrate, citing insecurity as the predominant reason. In particular, while the Taliban expanded rapidly across northern Afghanistan in August 2021, over half of the respondents from a set of northern provinces reported that they would migrate, naming insecurity as the primary cause.

In finding that potential migrants in all provinces state insecurity and unemployment as the main reasons for migrating, our analysis confirms previous research.[35] The desire to migrate for stable employment is common, and many households, particularly in rural areas, supplement local incomes with remittances sent by young family members working elsewhere.[36]

Figure 3: Respondents who would leave Afghanistan

Percentages reflect the proportion of respondents who responded yes to the question "Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?" Bar charts reflect the top 3 reasons for leaving.

Demographics and Social Factors

Internal and external migration in Afghanistan is linked to key demographic indicators including age, gender, residence, marital status, and years of education. Potential migrants have been shown in literature on the subject to be mostly male, relatively young (between 24 and 35 years), and living either in urban or rural settings.[37] Our analysis of the 2021 SAP data found that respondents who would like to migrate were on average (median) a little younger than those who did not (32 versus 35 years old), which is in line with past literature. Regression analysis shows that younger age was found to be consistently associated with the desire to leave Afghanistan for both 2019 and 2021. Random Forest Classifier exercises identify age as the top determinant of the desire to leave the country for both years (Appendix, **Table 2** and **Table 3**).

Two main categories of potential migrants have been identified by the literature: first, men traveling alone and seeking work, who are often from rural areas; and second, families who intend to apply for asylum, mainly coming from urban areas and with some economic means as a buffer.[38] The analysis of the 2021 SAP reflects findings found in the wider literature with over 40% of respondents expressing a desire to leave Afghanistan. A slightly higher proportion of men than women express the desire to migrate. (**Figure 4**).

Notably, the percentage of respondents who desired to leave the country in 2021 was the highest since 2011 when the annual SAP surveys started to include migration-related questions. (**Figure 5**). The top three reasons that women and men reported for leaving

Figure 4: Proportion of respondents who desired to leave by gender in 2021

Female

Yes 41%

Male

Yes 43%

Proportion of male and female respondents who answered,
"Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?"

Figure 5: Proportions of respondents who desired to leave by gender over time

Proportion of respondents who answered,
"Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?".

Afghanistan were the same: insecurity, unemployment, and weak government. However, a greater proportion of women named insecurity (69% for women versus 61% for men), and a greater proportion of men named unemployment (19% for men versus 11% for women) as reasons to leave. (See Appendix, **Table 2**, and **Table 3**)

In 2021, Afghanistan experienced its worst drought in over thirty years. Food insecurity has been driven by the impact of drought: crop failure, livestock losses, and the subsequent collapse of rural incomes. Severe and extensive drought is projected to persist into 2022.[39] Other climate-related disasters such as flooding are also expected to impact rural areas in the future, rendering land no longer productive, or leaving insufficient pasture for livestock.[40]

In 2021, almost 50% of those living in urban areas had a desire to migrate, compared with under 40% of those in rural areas (**Figure 6**). The top three reasons to leave Afghanistan for both urban and rural residents were insecurity (69%, 63%, respectively), unemployment (16%, 15%), and weak government (8%, 14%). Afghans living in urban areas (compared to rural areas) expressed a greater desire to leave in most years, and this desire grew over time (**Figure 7**). Relative to other determinants, urbanization was a top driver of migration in 2021. (Appendix, **Table 2**, see also **Table 3**).

Educational attainment as a migration factor varies across geographic locations. Previous research indicates, unsurprisingly, that potential migrants who reside in rural areas typically have a lower level of education than those in urban areas who have often completed high school or even a bachelor's degree.[41] However, the number of years spent in education was not found to be associated with a desire to leave Afghanistan in either 2019 or 2021 (Appendix, **Table 2**).

Figure 6: Percentage of respondents who desired to leave by geographic location in 2021

Rural

Urban

Yes 40%

Yes 50%

Percentage of respondents who answered,
"Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?"

Figure 7: Percentage of respondents who desired to leave by geography over time

■ Rural ■ Urban

Proportion of respondents who answered,
"Tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?"

Access to Health Care

Afghanistan confronts the simultaneous health impacts of Covid-19, severe drought, extensive food insecurity, and a sharp economic downturn, increased water-borne diseases, persistent polio strains, and the loss of funding to maintain critical health infrastructure. Women and girls are particularly impacted as their rights and opportunities have been diminished. Presently, 18.1 million people nationwide require a planned humanitarian response.[42]

In 2021, 58.2% of people who were surveyed reported visiting a public hospital or clinic in the past 12 months, while 41.8% visited private healthcare centers (Appendix, **Table 1**). Over a third, or 36.2%, of respondents reported that the health of family members had deteriorated in the previous year. Data suggests that people may be less likely to express a desire to leave the country if a family member is in poor health (Appendix, **Table 2**).

Access to Education

Limited educational opportunities in Afghanistan have affected women's contributions to the country's development.[43] Structural barriers and obstacles contributing to a lack of children's, and particularly girls', education include geographic isolation, economic difficulties, child marriage, and gender inequality, though there was a significant improvement over time.[44] After major progress from the early 2000s, 82.9% of girls were enrolled in primary education by 2018.[45] Despite this change, Afghanistan's education system faces multiple challenges as schools are under-resourced, lack qualified teachers, have limited physical infrastructure, and lack water and sanitation.[46] Research also stresses how displaced young women in large Afghan cities struggled significantly more than men to access education, health, and employment, even before the change of government in 2021.[47]

A lack of educational opportunities was the most-cited local problem among women responding to the SAP in 2021 (cited by 39% of respondents).[48] Data from the 2019 SAP also showed that families with more school-aged male children seem to be less likely to want to migrate. New government schools opening, new private schools opening, and quality of schools were also not found to be factors associated with a desire to migrate in either year. However, having a new private university in a locality was found to be positively associated with a stated willingness to leave the country, conferring 16% higher odds (Appendix, **Table 2**). This is consistent with earlier literature which posits that having a higher educational institute in a locality boosts migration since people would have greater aspirations and more financial resources yet encounter limited opportunities in the local area.

Infrastructure and Development

Data suggest that Afghans continue to struggle with issues plaguing key sectors of public infrastructure. In late 2021, the vast majority of Afghans (92%) reported using wood/charcoal, dung/waste or biomass as their primary source of heating.[49] This finding underscores the widespread lack of access to electricity within the country, as the 2021 SAP shows that only 22.7% of households were connected to government-supplied electricity (Appendix, **Table 1**). Greater access to government-supplied electricity was found to be associated with a desire to leave the country.

Access to water continues to be a daily challenge for Afghans. More than 55% percent of households at the end of 2021 reported a shortage of water for drinking and agriculture. Likewise, this trend may continue for the foreseeable future as UNOCHA estimates that 15.1 million Afghans will need a safe drinking water

supply in 2022. Survey responses show that the overall availability of clean drinking water had declined over the past year, with 37.3% of respondents citing deteriorating access (Appendix, **Table 1**).

Worse access to drinking water was found to be associated with a desire to migrate in 2021. Meanwhile, worse access to irrigation facilities and roads was found to be associated with a desire to migrate in 2019, but not in 2021. Reconstruction building of roads or bridges was positively associated with a desire to migrate (likely due to increased accessibility and the related desire to travel) while opening new factories was negatively associated (perhaps due to increased employment opportunities) (Appendix, **Table 2**). Having a mosque built nearby in the last 12 months was reported by 29% of respondents, and this was not found to be associated with the level of desire to migrate.

Women in Society

The current humanitarian crisis facing Afghanistan has left girls and women particularly vulnerable given the rapid advancement of discriminatory gender norms and the restriction of freedom and rights that negatively impact gender equality.[50] Afghanistan ranked 166 out of 167 countries on the 2020 Gender Development Index,[51] and last on the 2021 Global Women, Peace and Security Index.[52] Furthermore, 87% of Afghan women have experienced one form of intimate partner violence in their life,[53] 28% of Afghan women aged 15-49 years were married before the age of 18 years,[54] and more than 60% of children not attending school are girls.[55] Since August 2021, authorities have banned women and girls from secondary and higher education, restricted women's movements and their ability to work, closed the government's Ministry of Women's Affairs and imposed controls over women's clothing.[56] Before August 15, 2021, nearly 30% of parliamentarians were women, whereas all currently appointed government representatives are men.[57]

Regarding cultural norms and beliefs, nearly 60% of respondents in the 2021 SAP stated that the appropriate dress for women was either a burka or niqab while 34% suggested that leadership positions should be mainly for men.[58] Multivariable regression and machine learning models showed that women's conservative dress codes and political participation were important drivers of migration; specifically, those who supported more conservative dress and less political participation, were more inclined to stay (Appendix, **Table 2** and **3**).

Data shows that more liberal-minded people are more likely to wish to migrate. Nearly 56% of survey respondents felt that political leadership should be based on merit or equally available for men and women.[59] Furthermore, 89% of respondents felt that women should be allowed to vote, while over 56% felt that women should be allowed to decide their vote for themselves.

Photo: The Asia Foundation

Political Factors: conflict, violence, governance

Armed Conflict

Afghanistan has endured more than four decades of pervasive and severe conflict. The Annual Global Peace Index has ranked Afghanistan as the world's least peaceful country since 2018 and among the three least peaceful nations since 2010.[60] Consistent with the intensity of conflict, analyses found that 24.3% of Afghans were concerned for their family's safety in 2021, 44.7% expressed a desire to leave Afghanistan, and 84.3% cited insecurity as the main factor influencing their desire to migrate.[61] The 2021 SAP found that across all 34 provinces, insecurity was the primary reason Afghans wished to leave the country (**Figure 3**). Regression analysis found that fear for family safety was associated with a desire to migrate in 2019, and more strongly so in 2021 (Appendix, **Table 2**).

Violence and Crime

Between 2008 and 2021, Afghanistan saw a 66% increase in violent crime, a 33.7% increase in violent demonstrations, and an increase of over 80% in the number of internal conflicts.[62] Over 10,000 civilians were killed or injured annually between 2014 and 2019.[63] Furthermore, 5,138 civilians were reported killed or injured between January and June of 2021, a 47% increase over the same period for 2020.[64] Amnesty International detailed incidents of civilian torture, injury, and death by various entities during the months preceding the Taliban takeover.[65]

The 2021 SAP showed that 18% of survey respondents reported experiencing violence in the past year, and 33.6% of those reported experiencing a physical attack or beating.[66] In our regression analysis, experience of violence was positively associated with a desire to leave the country for both 2019 and 2021, highlighting violence as an important driver of migration (Appendix, **Table 2**). These findings support previous literature in highlighting conflict, violence, and insecurity as primary drivers of migration and displacement across Afghanistan.

Governance

Survey results indicate that Afghans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their government between 2019 and 2021 (**Figure 8**). Afghan's dissatisfaction with democracy increased from 32% in 2019 to 39% in 2021, and public lack of confidence in provincial councils increased from 42% in 2019 to 50% in 2021. Views on corruption were more consistent across that period. Respondents' perceptions of corruption in their daily lives increased marginally, from 68% to 71%, while perceptions of corruption as a major issue across Afghanistan remained the same at 82% (Appendix, **Table 1**). These findings are consistent with other sources which suggest that an increase in anti-government sentiment was one factor behind successful Taliban expansion. Regression analysis found that the desire to leave was positively associated with a lack of

Figure 8: Comparison of 2019 and 2021 governance indicators

Proportion of respondents who answered governance questions 2019, 2021.

confidence in central and provincial governments (Appendix, **Table 2**). Furthermore, dissatisfaction with democracy, lack of confidence in the elections commission, community development councils, government ministers, provincial councils, and the parliament were all among the top determinants of migration, both in 2019 and 2021 (Appendix, **Table 3**).

Shura or jirgas are community councils that deliberate on issues of concern and are a part of a larger system of informal governance in Afghanistan.[67] Even at the height of international efforts to establish a modern democratic government, Afghans had more trust in their traditional leaders such as shuras, than official government representatives.[68] Based on the 2021 SAP, approximately 36% of respondents indicated that they had little or no confidence in both religious leaders and community shuras/jirgas. Both a lack of confidence in religious leaders and a lack of confidence in community shuras/jirgas were identified as the top determinants of the desire to leave in 2019 and 2021 (Appendix, **Table 3**).

Economic Factors

The change in government in August 2021 worsened an already crippling economic crisis in Afghanistan, resulting in a grim economic outlook for 2022. The poor state of the labor market is highlighted by the SAP, with the majority (62%) of respondents stating that employment opportunities were worse than in the previous year. Likewise, 43.9% of respondents felt that their financial situations had worsened. The analysis found that economic factors were important determinants of migration, as having worse employment opportunities and being in a worse financial situation compared to the year before were positively associated with a willingness to migrate (Appendix, **Table 2C**).[69]

The abrupt change in government also exacerbated levels of poverty and hunger as sanctions prevented international aid from reaching the most vulnerable. Estimates from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) predicted a 10-13% decline in GDP. The 2021 SAP also shows that a considerable proportion of respondents have experienced declines in the quality (42.6%) and availability of food (50.3%) (Appendix, **Table 1A**).

Housing security has been severely impacted by insecurity and natural disasters. In some provinces, over 30% of households are severely damaged or destroyed by natural disasters or conflict.[70] In line with the current literature, the SAP showed that the physical condition of 32.6% of respondents' houses has deteriorated.

Even after the events of August 2021, the Afghan labor landscape continues to be dominated by precarious forms of employment. Between November to December 2021, 64% of employment contracts were classified as daily labor while 32% consisted of informal employment.[71]

Environmental Factors

Climate change can greatly increase the ongoing risks of displacement.[72] Changes in ecosystems caused by environmental change including biodiversity loss, water contamination, drought, land degradation, and deforestation have increasing effects on human conflict and migration decisions.[73] Drought frequency and severity have increased, in turn impacting agricultural productivity and farmers' livelihoods.[74]

In 2021, access to irrigation facilities was reported by 43% of respondents to have worsened in the past twelve months, an increase from 26% in 2019. Awareness of drinking water projects implemented in the local area dropped from 40% in 2006 to under 30% in 2021. Awareness of irrigation projects dropped from approximately 30% in 2007 to 20% in 2021 (Appendix, **Table 1**).

APPENDIX:
POLICIES ADDRESSING MIGRATION PUSH FACTORS

Historical and Current Policy Action

The Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries, by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), seeks to combine a rapid humanitarian response with a medium to long-term development plan in order to address ongoing humanitarian needs.[75] The three-year plan builds on the IOM's past humanitarian work in Afghanistan by dramatically scaling up efforts to reach 3.6 million crisis-affected Afghans including IDPs, migrants, returnees, refugees, and host communities.[76] Initiatives outlined in the plan that aim to address drivers of displacement include income-generating opportunities, community social cohesion, health facility financing, and support for local NGOs.[77]

The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan, consolidated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), aims to deliver a rapid response to the ongoing crisis, albeit on a much broader scale as it seeks to reach 22.1 million Afghans. The multi-sectoral approach not only seeks to address vulnerable populations such as IDPs and returnees, but also aims to provide humanitarian assistance across various sectors including education, shelter assistance, nutrition, health, food security and agriculture, and water, sanitation, and hygiene.[78]

The Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP), a broad partnership spearheaded by UNHCR, will support five regional governments in handling the large influx of Afghan migrants through 2022. The plan has called for US$ 259 million to support partner organizations tasked with aiding regional governments in ensuring asylum access, providing access to essential services, and supporting host communities.[79]

Figure 9: Timeline of migration-related policies

Demographics and Social Factors

Afghan refugee women and girls are disproportionately affected by gender-based violence (during flight and in neighboring countries), by barriers to accessing health including sexual and reproductive health services, and by barriers to accessing livelihood opportunities. A lower proportion of refugee girls compared to boys are in school.[80] UNHCR's Regional Refugee Response Plan aims to actively engage communities, and in particular hear the voices of women, girls, boys, men, and specifically marginalized and at-risk groups.[81] Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse is an integral part of the plan, as are gender equality measures including the provision of life-saving prevention and gender-based violence risk mitigation across all sector programs.[82]

The IOM's Comprehensive Action Plan for Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries stresses the importance of protecting vulnerable populations.[83] The plan covers several quick impact projects including cash grants and cash-for-work programs as well as tools, resources, and training to kick-start the recovery of livelihoods and basic community infrastructure. As young men in search of opportunities for improved livelihoods comprise a large group of Afghan migrants, these initiatives are particularly important.[84]

Access to Healthcare

More people than ever require health, nutrition, and protection support in Afghanistan, increasing the cost of the provision of adequate services.[85] According to possible scenarios considered by the UN Humanitarian Country Team and Inter-Cluster Coordination Team, it is assumed that the Sehatmandi health program and other important development programs will return shortly, but that they will operate at a lower capacity than in the past.[86] This would help improve access to life-saving services, strengthen systems overall, allow a response to outbreaks of disease, ensure safe and inclusive health care services, and improve the resilience of vulnerable people.[87]

Access to Education

Despite funding increases from last year, the Education in Emergencies program will only be able to target fewer than half of those in need. The cost per person has increased from US$92 to US$109, indicating the greater level of support required due to the deterioration of the public education system. Gaps in providing educational support to children with disabilities and special needs also exist. In response, over 27 organizations will provide support to the Education in Emergencies program.[88]

UNOCHA's 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan priorities include increasing access to safe, quality learning spaces for internally displaced people, cross-border returnees, and refugees as well as shock-affected children, and to provide continuity of learning for vulnerable children enrolled in public schools whose education has been affected by the leadership change. In order to further prevent out-of-school children from labor, early marriage, and other forms of exploitation and abuse, the Education Cluster (EC) will provide public school teachers with incentives, teaching and learning materials, and distance learning options. Furthermore, the EC will work with disability and inclusion partners to advance inclusion in the education system. The EC aims to scale up its response to reach up to 1.5 million children across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.[89]

Infrastructure and Development

UNOCHA's Humanitarian Response Plan seeks to support refugees, returnees, and displaced persons with skills development in various trades. Within the same response plan, UNOCHA also aims to support 10.4 million Afghans by rehabilitating and improving drinking water systems.[90] Moreover, the food security and agriculture cluster plans to provide two million people with access to irrigation to offset the impacts of drought. The IOM Comprehensive Action Plan also includes water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) initiatives for vulnerable Afghans.[91] Additionally, WASH is addressed as a planned priority under the UNHCR's Regional Response Plan. Under the RRP, safe water will be provided for displaced Afghans in neighboring countries.[92]

Women in Society

The UNHCR has reported that 80% of internally displaced individuals are women and children. Furthermore, Afghan women and girls are at increased risk of gender-based violence (GBV) during displacement and in neighboring countries. The UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 and the UNHCR-led Regional Refugee Response 2022 both prioritize multi-sectoral assistance including the provision of critical GBV programming and support for vulnerable at-risk women.[93] UN Women 2021 has also outlined the following recommendations to protect women's rights: restoring the Afghan women's movement through building partnerships with women's groups, increasing advocacy for women, supporting the provisions of services by women for women, and human rights monitoring.[94]

IOM incorporates culturally appropriate service delivery, particularly in mental and psychosocial support

for vulnerable populations including women.[95] The UN's 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan has also integrated gender equality and women's rights as a central priority across the strategy, along with guidance from the Afghan Women's Advisory Group in engaging with de facto authorities for inclusive policy development. Engaging with community shuras in multisectoral program development (climate resilience, education, and school management, refugee settlement and reintegration, community-based protection for vulnerable groups) has also been prioritized.[96]

Political Factors

The UNOCHA-led Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, Regional Refugee Response Plan 2022, and Afghan Red Crescent Society 2022 Response all emphasize community engagement and accountability including active consultation and coordination with community councils, affected populations, authorities, and humanitarian agencies.[97] Current UN policies to coordinate humanitarian assistance and become a "guarantor of peace and stability" are critical to ensuring peace and the flow of humanitarian aid. Secondly, the UN can serve as a neutral advisor to advance steps towards an inclusive and representative government and also promote an Afghan-led process of national reconciliation.[98] Rebuilding trust among communities, displaced populations, and local stakeholders, along with leveraging community councils in migration planning, has been recognized as critical to community stabilization and peacebuilding efforts.[99] Allowing for the safe return of IDPs and returning refugees through multi-sectoral reintegration assistance is critical during this time.[100] The IOM Comprehensive Action Plan outlines the provision of mental and psychosocial support for vulnerable migrants and displaced populations (including those experiencing violence).[101]

Economic Factors

Various agencies have outlined plans to alleviate economic conditions. Under the third strategic objective of its Comprehensive Action Plan, the IOM laid out a 3-year plan to support socio-economic recovery. This includes initiatives to increase skills acquisition and to provide access to employment for migrants. Through its first strategic objective, the Comprehensive Action Plan also aims to sustain and increase humanitarian interventions by providing emergency shelter, shelter repair, and transitional shelter support for recovering communities.[102] UNOCHA's Humanitarian Response Plan aims to provide emergency food assistance, increase local milling capacity for wheat production, and enhance subsistence food production at the local level.[103] Additionally, the UNHCR's Refugee Response Plan features entrepreneurship employment initiatives under its livelihoods and resilience response plan.[104]

Environmental Factors

The majority of environmentally-induced migration probably takes place within Afghanistan rather than across its borders. Policy responses aiming to assess links between environmental degradation, climate change impact, migration, and displacement have not yet been implemented in Afghanistan, and knowledge gaps remain over the extent to which migration is caused directly by climate change.[105] Projects implemented by UN agencies (UNDP and FAO) addressing issues such as land degradation, biodiversity loss, and community-based sustainable land and forest management have sought to build community resilience to climate-related shocks in order to prevent displacement.[106]

Table 1A: Descriptive statistics of the determinants of migration in 2019–2021

Variables	Level	2021	2019
		N (%)	
Possibility of reconciliation between Taliban and the Afghan government	No	15565 (90.8)	
	Yes	1572 (9.2)	
If fear for family safety	No	13123 (75.7)	
	Yes	4203 (24.3)	
If support a negotiate peace agreement with Taliban	No	9004 (52.8)	
	Yes	8061 (47.2)	
If support reintegration anti-government elements through government assistance	No	8200 (47.8)	
	Other	4742 (27.7)	
	Yes	4206 (24.5)	
Satisfaction with democracy	Very satisfied	2728 (15.9)	3079 (18.5)
	Somewhat satisfied	7707 (44.9)	8189 (49.1)
	Somewhat dissatisfied	4582 (26.7)	3745 (22.5)
	Very dissatisfied	2144 (12.5)	1654 (9.9)
Confidence in central government	A lot of confidence	3261 (19.0)	
	Some confidence	7212 (42.0)	
	Not much confidence	4437 (25.8)	
	No confidence	2274 (13.2)	
Confidence in provincial councils	A lot of confidence	2254 (13.2)	3022 (18.3)
	Some confidence	6263 (36.7)	6636 (40.1)
	Not much confidence	5408 (31.7)	4503 (27.2)
	No confidence	3124 (18.3)	2381 (14.4)
Confidence in community development councils	A lot of confidence	3336 (19.6)	
	Some confidence	6683 (39.2)	
	Not much confidence	4810 (28.2)	
	No confidence	2211 (13.0)	
Confidence in election commission	A lot of confidence	2042 (12.0)	
	Some confidence	5118 (30.0)	
	Not much confidence	5605 (32.8)	
	No confidence	4310 (25.2)	
Confidence in government ministers	A lot of confidence	1621 (9.5)	
	Some confidence	5287 (31.1)	
	Not much confidence	6311 (37.2)	
	No confidence	3755 (22.1)	
Confidence in International NGOs	A lot of confidence	2021 (12.0)	
	Some confidence	5875 (34.8)	
	Not much confidence	5658 (33.5)	
	No confidence	3341 (19.8)	

Variables	Level	2021	2019
		N (%)	
Confidence in parliament	A lot of confidence	1843 (10.8)	
	Some confidence	5559 (32.6)	
	Not much confidence	5750 (33.7)	
	No confidence	3901 (22.9)	
If corruption is a major problem in daily life	No	3658 (21.2)	3950 (23.7)
	Other	1285 (7.4)	1397 (8.4)
	Yes	12306 (71.3)	11335 (67.9)
If corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan	No	2454 (14.2)	2656 (15.9)
	Other	657 (3.8)	484 (2.9)
	Yes	14118 (81.9)	13574 (81.2)
Type of violence or crime you and your family experienced	Army actions	15 (0.5)	
	Foreign forces actions	19 (0.6)	
	Militants/Insurgent actions	89 (2.9)	
	Murder	144 (4.6)	
	Other	1616 (52.1)	
	Physical attack or beating	1044 (33.6)	
	Police actions	65 (2.1)	
	Sexual Violence	15 (0.5)	
	Suicide attacks	96 (3.1)	
If you and your family suffer from violence or crime	No	14203 (82.0)	
	Yes	3120 (18.0)	
Employment opportunities	Better	1134 (6.6)	
	The Same	5423 (31.4)	
	Worse	10731 (62.1)	
Financial situation	Better	2303 (13.3)	
	The Same	7404 (42.8)	
	Worse	7593 (43.9)	
Engaged in money-generating activity	No	9388 (54.2)	
	Yes	7947 (45.8)	
Physical condition of housing	Better	2196 (12.8)	
	The Same	9387 (54.6)	
	Worse	5607 (32.6)	
Quality of foods	Better	1923 (11.2)	
	The Same	7973 (46.2)	
	Worse	7347 (42.6)	
Availability of foods	Better	1554 (9.0)	
	The Same	7020 (40.7)	
	Worse	8669 (50.3)	

Variables	Level	2021	2019
		N (%)	
If experience corruption when applying for job	Had no contact	8700 (50.4)	
	In No cases	4894 (28.3)	
	In most cases	1205 (7.0)	
	In some cases	1990 (11.5)	
	In all cases	476 (2.8)	
If agriculture project implemented	No	13553 (78.8)	
	Yes	3636 (21.2)	
Gender	Female	8717 (50.2)	
	Male	8636 (49.8)	
Marital status	Married	13939 (80.4)	
	Single	3022 (17.4)	
	Widower/Widow	380 (2.2)	
Geography	Rural	12069 (69.5)	
	Urban	5284 (30.5)	
Health situation of your family members	Better	2802 (16.2)	
	The Same	8211 (47.6)	
	Worse	6250 (36.2)	
If healthcare project implemented	No	13301 (77.2)	
	Yes	3939 (22.8)	
If visit public hospital or clinic	No	7243 (41.8)	
	Yes	10068 (58.2)	
If visit private hospital or clinic	No	10055 (58.0)	
	Yes	7295 (42.0)	
If experience corruption when accessing healthcare	Had no contact	4693 (27.2)	
	In No cases	7938 (46.0)	
	In all cases	445 (2.6)	
	In most cases	1502 (8.7)	
	In some cases	2685 (15.6)	
If new government school opening	No	14111 (81.6)	
	Yes	3176 (18.4)	
If new private school opening	No	14292 (82.8)	
	Yes	2979 (17.2)	
If new private University	No	15809 (91.7)	
	Yes	1435 (8.3)	
Quality of school	Better	2437 (14.1)	
	The Same	8144 (47.3)	
	Worse	6643 (38.6)	

Variables	Level	2021	2019
		N (%)	
Access to drinking water	Better	3119 (18.1)	
	The Same	7712 (44.7)	
	Worse	6436 (37.3)	
If drinking water project implemented	No	12318 (71.4)	
	Yes	4928 (28.6)	
If government supplied electricity implemented	No	13299 (77.3)	
	Yes	3915 (22.7)	
If irrigation project implemented	No	13545 (78.8)	
	Yes	3636 (21.2)	
If reconstruction/building of roads or bridges	No	10703 (61.9)	
	Yes	6595 (38.1)	
If new factories opened	No	16087 (93.2)	
	Yes	1182 (6.8)	
Access to irrigation facilities	Better	1720 (10.1)	
	The Same	7917 (46.7)	
	Worse	7325 (43.2)	
Access to roads	Better	3516 (20.4)	
	The Same	8108 (46.9)	
	Worse	5650 (32.7)	
Electrical supply	Better	2533 (14.8)	
	The Same	7095 (41.5)	
	Worse	7448 (43.6)	
If building new mosques	No	12193 (70.7)	
	Yes	5059 (29.3)	
Confidence in religious Leaders	A lot of confidence	4476 (26.1)	
	Some confidence	6286 (36.7)	
	Not much confidence	4048 (23.6)	
	No confidence	2313 (13.5)	
Confidence in community Shuras/Jirgas	A lot of confidence	4275 (25.0)	
	Some confidence	6640 (38.9)	
	Not much confidence	4250 (24.9)	
	No confidence	1917 (11.2)	
Appropriate dress for women is a burka or niqab	No	7295 (42.5)	
	Yes	9860 (57.5)	
Gender equality in political leadership	Anyone based on merit	4492 (25.9)	
	Equal for both men and women	5177 (29.9)	
	Mostly for men	5871 (33.9)	
	Mostly for women	1771 (10.2)	

Variables	Level	2021	2019
		N (%)	
Should women be allowed to vote	No	1900 (11.0)	
	Yes	15370 (89.0)	
Should women decide vote for themselves	No	3193 (18.5)	
	Other	4278 (24.8)	
	Yes	9749 (56.6)	
Border district	Border district	1229 (7.1)	
	Non-border district	16124 (92.9)	
Occupation/Job	Formal workers	1533 (19.5)	
	Informal workers	3834 (48.8)	
	Self-employed	2492 (31.7)	
Desire to leave	No	9589 (55.3)	
	Yes	7764 (44.7)	

Variables	Mean (SD)
Average monthly income	7435.5 (13855.1)
Age	35.4 (12.7)
Years of education	1.6 (2.2)
Number of school age boys in the household	1.8 (1.4)
Number of school age girls in the household	1.7 (1.3)

Table 1B: Descriptive statistics of the determinants of migration in 2021 by desire to leave or not

Variables	Level	Desire to stay	Desire to leave
		N (%)	
Number of respondents		9589 (60)	7764 (40)
Possibility of reconciliation between Taliban and the Afghan government	No	8505 (89.9)	7060 (92.0)
	Yes	956 (10.1)	616 (8.0)
If fear for family safety	No	7513 (78.5)	5610 (72.4)
	Yes	2060 (21.5)	2143 (27.6)
If support a negotiate peace agreement with Taliban	No	4994 (52.9)	4010 (52.5)
	Yes	4440 (47.1)	3621 (47.5)
If support reintegration anti-government elements through government assistance	No	4495 (47.4)	3705 (48.3)
	Other	2695 (28.4)	2047 (26.7)
	Yes	2290 (24.2)	1916 (25.0)
Satisfaction with democracy	Very satisfied	1434 (15.1)	1294 (16.8)
	Somewhat satisfied	4241 (44.8)	3466 (45.1)
	Somewhat dissatisfied	2571 (27.1)	2011 (26.2)
	Very dissatisfied	1230 (13.0)	914 (11.9)

Variables	Level	Desire to stay	Desire to leave
		N (%)	
Confidence in central government	A lot of confidence	1927 (20.3)	1334 (17.4)
	Some confidence	3962 (41.7)	3250 (42.3)
	Not much confidence	2426 (25.5)	2011 (26.2)
	No confidence	1183 (12.5)	1091 (14.2)
Confidence in provincial councils	A lot of confidence	1287 (13.7)	967 (12.7)
	Some confidence	3481 (36.9)	2782 (36.5)
	Not much confidence	2918 (31.0)	2490 (32.7)
	No confidence	1738 (18.4)	1386 (18.2)
Confidence in community development councils	A lot of confidence	1971 (20.9)	1365 (17.9)
	Some confidence	3597 (38.2)	3086 (40.5)
	Not much confidence	2646 (28.1)	2164 (28.4)
	No confidence	1205 (12.8)	1006 (13.2)
Confidence in election commission	A lot of confidence	1191 (12.6)	851 (11.1)
	Some confidence	2848 (30.2)	2270 (29.7)
	Not much confidence	3102 (32.9)	2503 (32.8)
	No confidence	2296 (24.3)	2014 (26.4)
Confidence in government ministers	A lot of confidence	923 (9.8)	698 (9.2)
	Some confidence	2947 (31.4)	2340 (30.8)
	Not much confidence	3482 (37.1)	2829 (37.2)
	No confidence	2027 (21.6)	1728 (22.8)
Confidence in International NGOs	A lot of confidence	1093 (11.7)	928 (12.3)
	Some confidence	3193 (34.2)	2682 (35.4)
	Not much confidence	3178 (34.1)	2480 (32.8)
	No confidence	1863 (20.0)	1478 (19.5)
Confidence in parliament	A lot of confidence	1003 (10.6)	840 (11.0)
	Some confidence	3114 (33.1)	2445 (32.0)
	Not much confidence	3150 (33.4)	2600 (34.1)
	No confidence	2154 (22.9)	1747 (22.9)
If corruption is a major problem in daily life	No	2049 (21.5)	1609 (20.8)
	Other	767 (8.0)	518 (6.7)
	Yes	6714 (70.5)	5592 (72.4)
If corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan	No	1398 (14.7)	1056 (13.7)
	Other	406 (4.3)	251 (3.3)
	Yes	7711 (81.0)	6407 (83.1)

Variables	Level	Desire to stay	Desire to leave
		N (%)	
Type of violence or crime you and your family experienced	Army actions	12 (0.7)	3 (0.2)
	Foreign forces actions	11 (0.7)	8 (0.6)
	Militants/Insurgent actions	52 (3.1)	37 (2.6)
	Murder	86 (5.1)	58 (4.1)
	Other	813 (48.6)	803 (56.1)
	Physical attack or beating	594 (35.5)	450 (31.4)
	Police actions	44 (2.6)	21 (1.5)
	Sexual Violence	8 (0.5)	7 (0.5)
	Suicide attacks	52 (3.1)	44 (3.1)
If you and your family suffer from violence or crime	No	7896 (82.4)	6307 (81.4)
	Yes	1681 (17.6)	1439 (18.6)
Employment opportunities	Better	688 (7.2)	446 (5.8)
	The Same	3107 (32.5)	2316 (30.0)
	Worse	5763 (60.3)	4968 (64.3)
Financial situation	Better	1347 (14.1)	956 (12.3)
	The Same	4263 (44.6)	3141 (40.6)
	Worse	3946 (41.3)	3647 (47.1)
Engaged in money-generating activity	No	5277 (55.1)	4111 (53.0)
	Yes	4305 (44.9)	3642 (47.0)
Physical condition of housing	Better	1253 (13.2)	943 (12.3)
	The Same	5144 (54.1)	4243 (55.3)
	Worse	3115 (32.7)	2492 (32.5)
Quality of foods	Better	1101 (11.6)	822 (10.6)
	The Same	4414 (46.4)	3559 (46.1)
	Worse	4008 (42.1)	3339 (43.3)
Availability of foods	Better	889 (9.3)	665 (8.6)
	The Same	3919 (41.1)	3101 (40.2)
	Worse	4724 (49.6)	3945 (51.2)
If experience corruption when applying for job	Had no contact	4919 (51.6)	3781 (49.0)
	In No cases	2680 (28.1)	2214 (28.7)
	In most cases	665 (7.0)	540 (7.0)
	In some cases	1040 (10.9)	950 (12.3)
	In all cases	237 (2.5)	239 (3.1)
If agriculture project implemented	No	7323 (77.1)	6230 (81.0)
	Yes	2172 (22.9)	1464 (19.0)
Gender	Female	4901 (51.1)	3816 (49.1)
	Male	4688 (48.9)	3948 (50.9)

Variables	Level	Desire to stay	Desire to leave
		N (%)	
Marital status	Married	7931 (82.8)	6008 (77.4)
	Single	1434 (15.0)	1588 (20.5)
	Widower/Widow	217 (2.3)	163 (2.1)
Geography	Rural	7021 (73.2)	5048 (65.0)
	Urban	2568 (26.8)	2716 (35.0)
Health situation of your family members	Better	1559 (16.3)	1243 (16.1)
	The Same	4566 (47.9)	3645 (47.2)
	Worse	3416 (35.8)	2834 (36.7)
If healthcare project implemented	No	7253 (76.2)	6048 (78.3)
	Yes	2267 (23.8)	1672 (21.7)
If visit public hospital or clinic	No	4004 (41.9)	3239 (41.8)
	Yes	5560 (58.1)	4508 (58.2)
If visit private hospital or clinic	No	5572 (58.1)	4483 (57.7)
	Yes	4015 (41.9)	3280 (42.3)
If experience corruption when accessing healthcare	Had no contact	2539 (26.6)	2154 (27.9)
	In No cases	4415 (46.3)	3523 (45.6)
	In all cases	254 (2.7)	191 (2.5)
	In most cases	824 (8.6)	678 (8.8)
	In some cases	1506 (15.8)	1179 (15.3)
If new government school opening	No	7727 (80.9)	6384 (82.5)
	Yes	1819 (19.1)	1357 (17.5)
If new private school opening	No	7946 (83.3)	6346 (82.1)
	Yes	1592 (16.7)	1387 (17.9)
If new private University	No	8790 (92.2)	7019 (91.0)
	Yes	739 (7.8)	696 (9.0)
Quality of school	Better	1438 (15.1)	999 (13.0)
	The Same	4417 (46.4)	3727 (48.3)
	Worse	3658 (38.5)	2985 (38.7)
Access to drinking water	Better	1798 (18.9)	1321 (17.1)
	The Same	4214 (44.2)	3498 (45.2)
	Worse	3524 (37.0)	2912 (37.7)
If drinking water project implemented	No	6767 (71.1)	5551 (71.8)
	Yes	2752 (28.9)	2176 (28.2)
If government supplied electricity implemented	No	7434 (78.3)	5865 (76.0)
	Yes	2064 (21.7)	1851 (24.0)
If irrigation project implemented	No	7432 (78.3)	6113 (79.5)
	Yes	2062 (21.7)	1574 (20.5)
If reconstruction/building of roads or bridges	No	6013 (62.9)	4690 (60.6)
	Yes	3541 (37.1)	3054 (39.4)

Variables	Level	Desire to stay	Desire to leave
		N (%)	
If new factories opened	No	8834 (92.5)	7253 (93.9)
	Yes	713 (7.5)	469 (6.1)
Access to irrigation facilities	Better	1028 (11.0)	692 (9.1)
	The Same	4307 (45.9)	3610 (47.6)
	Worse	4049 (43.1)	3276 (43.2)
Access to roads	Better	1945 (20.4)	1571 (20.3)
	The Same	4407 (46.2)	3701 (47.9)
	Worse	3194 (33.5)	2456 (31.8)
Electrical supply	Better	1316 (14.0)	1217 (15.9)
	The Same	3993 (42.5)	3102 (40.4)
	Worse	4096 (43.6)	3352 (43.7)
If building new mosques	No	6681 (70.1)	5512 (71.3)
	Yes	2845 (29.9)	2214 (28.7)
Confidence in religious Leaders	A lot of confidence	2631 (27.8)	1845 (24.1)
	Some confidence	3448 (36.5)	2838 (37.0)
	Not much confidence	2167 (22.9)	1881 (24.5)
	No confidence	1209 (12.8)	1104 (14.4)
Confidence in community Shuras/Jirgas	A lot of confidence	2492 (26.4)	1783 (23.3)
	Some confidence	3639 (38.5)	3001 (39.3)
	Not much confidence	2301 (24.4)	1949 (25.5)
	No confidence	1014 (10.7)	903 (11.8)
Appropriate dress for women is a burka or niqab	No	3644 (38.4)	3651 (47.6)
	Yes	5834 (61.6)	4026 (52.4)
Gender equality in political leadership	Anyone based on merit	2389 (25.0)	2103 (27.2)
	Equal for both men and women	2721 (28.4)	2456 (31.7)
	Mostly for men	3479 (36.3)	2392 (30.9)
	Mostly for women	982 (10.3)	789 (10.2)
Should women be allowed to vote	No	1311 (13.7)	589 (7.6)
	Yes	8232 (86.3)	7138 (92.4)
Should women decide vote for themselves	No	1979 (20.8)	1214 (15.7)
	Other	2490 (26.2)	1788 (23.2)
	Yes	5037 (53.0)	4712 (61.1)
Border district	Border district	702 (7.3)	527 (6.8)
	Non-border district	8887 (92.7)	7237 (93.2)
Occupation/Job	Formal workers	793 (18.7)	740 (20.5)
	Informal workers	2080 (48.9)	1754 (48.6)
	Self-employed	1377 (32.4)	1115 (30.9)

Variables	Level	Desire to stay	Desire to leave
		N (%)	
Variables		Mean (SD)	
Average monthly income		7071.8 (13157.7)	7884.6 (14659.0)
Age		36.3 (12.9)	34.4 (12.3)
Years of education		1.5 (2.2)	1.7 (2.3)
Number of school age boys in the household		1.9 (1.4)	1.8 (1.4)
Number of school age girls in the household		1.7 (1.3)	1.6 (1.4)

Table 2A: Regression Analysis Result for 2019

Determinants of migration	2019					
				95% CI		
	B	SE	z	LL	UL	p
Reconciliation between Taliban and the Afghan government is possible	0.01	0.06	0.17	-0.12	0.14	0.86
Be afraid for family safety	0.14	0.06	2.48	0.03	0.24	0.01
Support a negotiate peace agreement with Taliban	-0.06	0.04	-1.39	-0.13	0.02	0.16
Support reintegration anti-government elements through government assistance	-0.13	0.04	-3.08	-0.21	-0.05	0.00
Dissatisfaction with democracy	-0.05	0.02	-2.11	-0.09	0.00	0.04
Lack of confidence in central government						
Lack of confidence in provincial councils	0.04	0.03	1.40	-0.02	0.09	0.16
Lack of confidence in community development councils	0.02	0.03	0.78	-0.03	0.07	0.44
Lack of confidence in election commission	0.01	0.02	0.58	-0.03	0.06	0.56
Lack of confidence in government ministers	0.09	0.03	3.38	0.04	0.14	0.00
Lack of confidence in International NGOs	-0.05	0.02	-2.29	-0.10	-0.01	0.02
Lack of confidence in parliament	0.01	0.03	0.25	-0.04	0.06	0.81
Corruption is a major problem in daily life	0.02	0.04	0.36	-0.07	0.10	0.72
Corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan	-0.02	0.05	-0.43	-0.12	0.08	0.67
Experience army actions	0.86	0.46	1.87	-0.04	1.76	0.06
Experience foreign forces actions	-0.73	0.33	-2.19	-1.38	-0.08	0.03
Experience militants' insurgent actions	-0.40	0.25	-1.64	-0.88	0.08	0.10
Experience murder	0.27	0.21	1.29	-0.14	0.67	0.20
Experience physical attack or beating	0.06	0.10	0.57	-0.14	0.25	0.57
Experience police actions	-0.56	0.28	-2.01	-1.11	-0.01	0.05
Experience sexual violence	0.53	0.67	0.78	-0.79	1.84	0.43
Experience suicide attacks	-0.54	0.22	-2.43	-0.98	-0.10	0.02
You and your family suffer from violence or crime	0.19	0.07	2.88	0.06	0.32	0.00

Determinants of migration	2019					
	B	SE	z	95% CI		p
				LL	UL	
Employment opportunities getting worse	0.09	0.03	2.78	0.03	0.16	0.01
Financial situation getting worse	0.11	0.03	3.26	0.04	0.17	0.00
Engage in money generating activities	-0.05	0.06	-0.80	-0.17	0.07	0.42
Average monthly income	0.00	0.00	-1.63	0.00	0.00	0.10
House physical conditions getting worse	0.01	0.03	0.37	-0.05	0.08	0.71
Quality of foods getting worse	0.02	0.03	0.57	-0.05	0.08	0.57
Availability of foods getting worse	0.04	0.03	1.28	-0.02	0.11	0.20
Experience corruption when applying for job	0.12	0.09	1.31	-0.06	0.30	0.19
Agriculture project implemented	-0.09	0.05	-1.92	-0.19	0.00	0.05
Drinking water project implemented	-0.06	0.05	-1.31	-0.15	0.03	0.19
Irrigation project implemented	-0.08	0.05	-1.42	-0.18	0.03	0.16
Age	-0.01	0.00	-6.68	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
Male	0.16	0.06	2.82	0.05	0.27	0.01
Married	-0.11	0.05	-2.24	-0.21	-0.01	0.03
Urban	0.00	0.05	0.03	-0.10	0.10	0.98
Years of education	-0.02	0.01	-1.90	-0.03	0.00	0.06
Health situation of your family members getting worse	0.00	0.03	0.00	-0.06	0.06	1.00
Healthcare project implemented	-0.09	0.05	-1.82	-0.18	0.01	0.07
Visit public hospital or clinic	-0.03	0.04	-0.66	-0.10	0.05	0.51
Visit private hospital or clinic	0.03	0.04	0.84	-0.04	0.11	0.40
Experience corruption when accessing healthcare	0.16	0.11	1.41	-0.06	0.38	0.16
New government school opening	-0.02	0.05	-0.46	-0.13	0.08	0.65
New private school opening	-0.03	0.06	-0.57	-0.14	0.08	0.57
New private University opening	0.06	0.08	0.78	-0.09	0.21	0.44
Number of school age boys in the household	-0.06	0.02	-4.00	-0.09	-0.03	0.00
Number of school age girls in the household	0.02	0.02	1.29	-0.01	0.05	0.20
Quality of school getting worse	-0.03	0.03	-0.88	-0.09	0.03	0.38
Access to drinking water getting worse	-0.01	0.03	-0.23	-0.07	0.05	0.82
Government supplied electricity implemented	0.08	0.05	1.55	-0.02	0.18	0.12
Reconstruction or building of roads or bridges	-0.04	0.04	-0.83	-0.12	0.05	0.41
New factories opening	-0.09	0.09	-1.03	-0.25	0.08	0.30
Access to irrigation facilities getting worse	0.08	0.03	2.28	0.01	0.15	0.02
Access to roads getting worse	0.09	0.03	3.04	0.03	0.15	0.00
Electrical supply getting worse	-0.01	0.03	-0.22	-0.06	0.05	0.82
Building of new mosques	0.05	0.04	1.24	-0.03	0.14	0.22
Lack of confidence in religious leaders	0.07	0.02	3.27	0.03	0.12	0.00

Determinants of migration	2019					
	B	**SE**	**z**	**95% CI**		**p**
				LL	**UL**	
Lack of confidence in community Shuras/Jirgas	-0.04	0.03	-1.65	-0.09	0.01	0.10
Appropriate dress for women is a burka or niqab	-0.33	0.04	-7.94	-0.41	-0.25	0.00
Political leadership mostly for men	-0.02	0.04	-0.57	-0.11	0.06	0.57
Women should decide vote for themselves	0.08	0.04	2.09	0.01	0.16	0.04
Women should be allowed to vote	0.27	0.07	4.08	0.14	0.41	0.00
Have border district	0.15	0.06	2.50	0.03	0.26	0.01
Informal workers	0.10	0.06	1.73	-0.01	0.21	0.08

Note: Dependent variable = Desire to leave (1=yes, 0=no)

Table 2B: Significant Determinants of migration in 2019 ranked by absolute standardized coefficients

Significant Determinants of Migration	Absolute standardized coefficients
Experience foreign forces actions	0.73
Experience police actions	0.56
Experience suicide attacks	0.54
Appropriate dress for women is a burka or niqab	0.33
Women should be allowed to vote	0.27
You and your family suffer from violence or crime	0.19
Male	0.16
Have border district	0.15
Have fear for family safety	0.14
Age	0.13
Support reintegration anti-government elements through government assistance	0.13
Married	0.11
Number of school age boys in the household	0.08
Lack of confidence in government ministers	0.08
Financial situation getting worse	0.08
Lack of confidence in religious leaders	0.07
Access to roads getting worse	0.07
Employment opportunities getting worse	0.06
Access to irrigation facilities getting worse	0.05
Lack of confidence in International NGOs	0.05
Dissatisfaction with democracy	0.04

Table 2C: Regression Analysis Result for 2021

Determinants	2021			95% CI		
	B	SE	z	LL	UL	p
Reconciliation between Taliban and the Afghan government is possible	-0.12	0.06	-1.82	-0.24	0.01	0.07
Be afraid for family safety	0.25	0.04	6.18	0.17	0.33	0.00
Support a negotiate peace agreement with Taliban	-0.01	0.04	-0.23	-0.08	0.06	0.82
Support reintegration anti-government elements through government assistance	-0.02	0.04	-0.39	-0.10	0.07	0.70
Dissatisfaction with democracy	-0.03	0.02	-1.40	-0.07	0.01	0.16
Lack of confidence in central government	0.07	0.02	2.98	0.02	0.11	0.00
Lack of confidence in provincial councils	-0.05	0.03	-1.82	-0.10	0.00	0.07
Lack of confidence in community development councils	0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.05	0.05	0.98
Lack of confidence in election commission	0.01	0.02	0.32	-0.04	0.05	0.75
Lack of confidence in government ministers	0.01	0.02	0.45	-0.04	0.06	0.65
Lack of confidence in International NGOs	-0.01	0.02	-0.51	-0.05	0.03	0.61
Lack of confidence in parliament	-0.02	0.02	-0.93	-0.07	0.03	0.35
Corruption is a major problem in daily life	-0.02	0.04	-0.57	-0.11	0.06	0.57
Corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan	0.01	0.05	0.20	-0.09	0.11	0.84
Experience army actions	-0.33	0.74	-0.44	-1.77	1.12	0.66
Experience foreign forces actions	-0.37	0.54	-0.68	-1.43	0.70	0.50
Experience militants' insurgent actions	-0.65	0.27	-2.38	-1.18	-0.12	0.02
Experience murder	-0.63	0.20	-3.16	-1.02	-0.24	0.00
Experience physical attack or beating	-0.16	0.09	-1.79	-0.33	0.02	0.07
Experience police actions	-0.65	0.30	-2.16	-1.23	-0.06	0.03
Experience sexual violence	0.36	0.49	0.73	-0.60	1.31	0.46
Experience suicide attacks	-0.12	0.24	-0.51	-0.60	0.35	0.61
You and your family suffer from violence or crime	0.23	0.06	4.04	0.12	0.35	0.00
Employment opportunities getting worse	0.10	0.04	2.80	0.03	0.16	0.01
Financial situation getting worse	0.10	0.03	3.15	0.04	0.16	0.00
Engage in money generating activities	0.02	0.05	0.40	-0.08	0.13	0.69
Average monthly income	0.00	0.00	2.09	0.00	0.00	0.04
House physical conditions getting worse	0.01	0.03	0.35	-0.05	0.07	0.73
Quality of foods getting worse	-0.05	0.03	-1.49	-0.11	0.02	0.14
Availability of foods getting worse	0.00	0.03	0.16	-0.06	0.07	0.88
Experience corruption when applying for job	0.31	0.11	2.90	0.10	0.51	0.00
Agriculture project implemented	-0.15	0.05	-3.04	-0.24	-0.05	0.00
Drinking water project implemented	0.06	0.04	1.41	-0.02	0.15	0.16
Irrigation project implemented	-0.10	0.05	-2.10	-0.20	-0.01	0.04

Determinants	2021					
	B	**SE**	**z**	**95% CI**		**p**
				LL	**UL**	
Age	-0.01	0.00	-7.14	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
Male	0.12	0.05	2.29	0.02	0.22	0.02
Married	-0.09	0.05	-1.93	-0.19	0.00	0.05
Urban	0.14	0.04	3.31	0.06	0.23	0.00
Years of education	0.00	0.01	0.36	-0.01	0.02	0.72
Health situation of your family members getting worse	-0.05	0.03	-1.75	-0.10	0.01	0.08
Healthcare project implemented	0.00	0.05	0.05	-0.09	0.09	0.96
Visit public hospital or clinic	0.02	0.04	0.64	-0.05	0.09	0.53
Visit private hospital or clinic	-0.01	0.04	-0.26	-0.08	0.06	0.79
Experience corruption when accessing healthcare	-0.05	0.11	-0.41	-0.27	0.18	0.68
New government school opening	0.01	0.05	0.28	-0.09	0.11	0.78
New private school opening	-0.06	0.05	-1.21	-0.16	0.04	0.23
New private University opening	0.15	0.06	2.28	0.02	0.27	0.02
Number of school age boys in the household	-0.02	0.01	-1.84	-0.05	0.00	0.07
Number of school age girls in the household	-0.01	0.01	-0.48	-0.03	0.02	0.63
Quality of school getting worse	-0.01	0.03	-0.51	-0.07	0.04	0.61
Access to drinking water getting worse	0.07	0.03	2.43	0.01	0.13	0.02
Government supplied electricity implemented	0.14	0.05	3.03	0.05	0.24	0.00
Reconstruction or building of roads or bridges	0.15	0.04	3.79	0.08	0.23	0.00
New factories opening	-0.24	0.08	-3.20	-0.39	-0.09	0.00
Access to irrigation facilities getting worse	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	-0.08	0.04	0.53
Access to roads getting worse	0.03	0.03	1.01	-0.03	0.08	0.31
Electrical supply getting worse	-0.07	0.03	-2.42	-0.12	-0.01	0.02
Building of new mosques	0.00	0.04	0.04	-0.08	0.08	0.97
Lack of confidence in religious leaders	0.07	0.02	3.34	0.03	0.11	0.00
Lack of confidence in community Shuras/Jirgas	0.04	0.02	1.66	-0.01	0.09	0.10
Appropriate dress for women is a burka or niqab	-0.27	0.04	-7.21	-0.34	-0.20	0.00
Political leadership mostly for men	-0.10	0.04	-2.48	-0.18	-0.02	0.01
Women should decide vote for themselves	0.16	0.04	4.29	0.09	0.24	0.00
Women should be allowed to vote	0.56	0.06	9.22	0.44	0.68	0.00
Have border district	0.00	0.08	0.06	-0.14	0.15	0.96
Informal workers	0.11	0.05	2.14	0.01	0.21	0.03

Note: Dependent variable = Desire to leave (1=yes, 0=no)

Table 2D: Significant Determinants of migration in 2021 ranked by absolute standardized coefficients

Significant Determinants of Migration	Absolute standardized coefficients
Experience police actions	0.65
Experience militants' insurgent actions	0.65
Experience murder	0.63
Women should be allowed to vote	0.56
Experience corruption when applying for job	0.31
Appropriate dress for women is a burka or niqab	0.27
Be afraid for family safety	0.25
New factories opening	0.24
You and your family suffer from violence or crime	0.23
Women should decide vote for themselves	0.16
Reconstruction or building of roads or bridges	0.15
Agriculture project implemented	0.15
New private University opening	0.15
Urban	0.14
Government supplied electricity implemented	0.14
Age	0.14
Male	0.12
Informal workers	0.11
Irrigation project implemented	0.10
Political leadership mostly for men	0.10
Married	0.09
Lack of confidence in religious leaders	0.07
Financial situation getting worse	0.07
Employment opportunities getting worse	0.06
Access to drinking water getting worse	0.05
Electrical supply getting worse	0.05
Lack of confidence in central government	0.04
Average monthly income	0.04

Table 3A: Feature Importance based on Random Forest Classifier for 2019

Table 3B: Feature Importance based on Random Forest Classifier for 2021

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Further information on the Survey of the Afghan People

The longest-running barometer of Afghan opinion, the Survey of the Afghan People presents a clear picture of the gains and gaps that Afghans perceive in a rapidly transforming nation. The survey, now in its sixteenth edition, has gathered the views of more than 148,000 Afghans since 2004 on issues of security, peace and reconciliation, the economy, governance, and women's rights.

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